Essays on Human and Social Capital Accumulation by Fischer, Stefanie Jane
UC Santa Barbara
UC Santa Barbara Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Title
Essays on Human and Social Capital Accumulation
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9cs669rv
Author
Fischer, Stefanie Jane
Publication Date
2015
 
Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
Santa Barbara
Essays on Human and Social Capital
Accumulation
A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Economics
by
Stefanie Jane Fischer
Committee in Charge:
Professor Kelly Bedard, Co-Chair
Professor Peter Kuhn, Co-Chair
Professor Shelly Lundberg
June 2015
The Dissertation of
Stefanie Jane Fischer is approved:
Professor Shelly Lundberg
Professor Peter Kuhn, Committee Co-Chairperson
Professor Kelly Bedard, Committee Co-Chairperson
June 2015
Essays on Human and Social Capital Accumulation
Copyright c© 2015
by
Stefanie Jane Fischer
iii
To my mother, I would never have made it
through this without your love, support, and
unwaivering belief in me.
iv
Acknowledgements
Many people have supported me throughout this six-year long marathon, and for
that I am truly grateful. Without the support of my family, friends, fellow graduate
students and committee, this feat would not have been possible. My parents have been
my constant support – always believing in me even when I didn’t believe in myself.
They provided endless amounts of encouragement, offered an ear when I needed to
vent, and were always ready to celebrate the smallest victories. I thank my mother for
helping me see the positive side to everything – even in those times when there didn’t
seem like there was one. I thank my dad for instilling in me, from a very young age, a
strong work ethic. And, I owe both of them credit for helping shape my research agenda
– my dad for encouraging me throughout my life to be intellectually curious, my mom
for sharing her passion for public education, and both of them for teaching me to care
about the wellbeing of others. Thank you to my brother and sister-in-law for their
technical support at all hours of the day and night, to my grandmother for teaching me
to be a “pushy broad”, and to my grandfather for taking me to my first college lectures
at a young age sparking my love for learning. Thank you to the Robinson’s for being
my home-away-from-home.
I am forever grateful to my advisor, Kelly Bedard and to the other members of my
committee, Peter Kuhn and Shelly Lundberg. Thank you to Kelly for the countless
hours spent mentoring and guiding me in my research and in life. Kelly has pushed
me to my highest potential with patients and kindness, and I would not be where I am
today without her as a role model. I am humbled to have had the opportunity to work
with such an incredible economist and person. Thank you to Peter Kuhn for diligently
v
reading and re-reading drafts, always providing insightful comments. I thank my two
coauthors Daniel Argyle and Christiana Stoddard .
Without my fellow classmates I would have given up long ago. Thanks to Ryan
Abman, Tom Zimmerfaust, Vedant Koppera, and Sara Sutherland for being the best first
year study buddies anyone could ask for. Thank you to Jenna Stearns for the reserach
support and friendship, I should have added her to my committee long ago, and to Adam
Wright for teaching me how to teach and for keeping things light. Thank you to the
Education Working Group for helpful comments. Last, I thank all of my friends near
and far, especially the good folks of Santa Barbara, for keeping me balanced and giving
me perspective. Thank you to Ann Micka and Corey White for Saturday morning East
Mountain loop bike rides, and the girls (Fran, Kelsey and Julie) for getting me out in
the mountains and for making me splurge on good dinners every now and then. The
past six years, as so many of you know, have been a wild ride – with plenty of triumphs
and failures along the way. Thank you for lifting me up and for being part of it.
vi
Curriculum Vitæ
Stefanie Jane Fischer
Education
Ph.D., Economics, University of California Santa Barbara, 2015
M.A. Applied Economics, Montana State University, 2009
B.S. Mathematics, Minor: Economics, Linfield College, 2005
Research Fields
Labor, Applied Econometrics, Applied Microeconomics, Education, Health
Committee Members
Kelly Bedard (Co-Chair), Peter Kuhn (Co-Chair), Shelly Lundberg
Honors and Fellowships
Experimental Research Grant (UCSB Graduate Division), 2013 and 2015
Humanities and Social Sciences Research Grant (UCSB Graduate Division), 2013
Broom Center for Demography Graduate Fellow (UCSB), 2012- 2015
Walter Mead Graduate Fellowship (UCSB), 2009-2010
President’s Fellowship (Montana State University), 2007-2008
Faculty Merit Scholarship (Linfield College), 2001-2005
Teaching Experience
Introduction to Econometric Theory (Instructor)
vii
Introduction to Econometric Theory (Teaching Assistant)
Intermediate Microeconomics (Teaching Assistant)
Principles of Economics (Teaching Assistant)
Financial Management (Teaching Assistant)
Public Finance (Teaching Assistant)
Conferences and Seminar Presentations
2015: UC Irvine, Utah State, Colgate University, Sonoma State, Cal Poly (SLO), CNA Corpo-
ration
2014: UC Santa Barbara, WEAI’s Graduate Student Dissertation Workshop (Denver), Poster
Presentation at All California Labor Conference (UC Berkeley)
2013: Western Economic Association International Conference (Seattle), Poster Presentation at
All California Labor Conference (UC San Diego)
2012: Poster Presentation All California Labor Conference (San Francisco)
Professional Experience
Invited member of Human Capital Research Working Group (UCSB)
Constructed and administered large-scale field experiment on optimal group size - sampled
1,800 students
Research Assistant for Professor Kelly Bedard, 2013 and 2011
Referee for Economics of Education Review (2), Population Research and Policy Review (1)
viii
Abstract
Essays on Human and Social Capital Accumulation
Stefanie Jane Fischer
This dissertation consists of three essays in applied microeconomics that address
topics of human and social capital accumulation. The first essay addresses the topic
of women and STEM (science, technology, engineering and math.) Women are sub-
stantially less likely than men to graduate college with a STEM degree. This paper
investigates whether class composition can help explain why women are dispropor-
tionately more likely to fall out of the STEM “pipeline”. Identification comes from
a standardized enrollment process at a large public university that randomly assigns
freshmen to different mandatory introductory chemistry lectures. Using administrative
data, I find that women who are enrolled in a class with higher ability peers are less
likely to graduate with a STEM degree, while men’s persistence in STEM is unaffected
by class composition. I also show that the decline for women is most pronounced for
those in the bottom third of the ability distribution. I rule out the possibility that this is
driven solely by grades because both men and women receive higher grades in classes
with higher ability peers. Overall, these results suggest that class composition as an
important factor in determining STEM persistence for women and provide a novel ex-
planation for part of the STEM gender gap in post-secondary education.
The second essay, co-authored with Daniel Argyle, examines the effect of the four-
day school week in rural Colorado on juvenile crimes. Four-day school weeks are
becoming more common nationwide especially in rural areas. Those affected by the
policy spend the same number of hours in school each week as students on a typical
ix
five-day week, however the four-day week schedule essentially reallocates unstructured
time into larger blocks creating a three-day weekend every weekend, since treated stu-
dents for the most part have Fridays off. Our difference-in-difference estimates for
rural Colorado indicate that switching all students in a county from a five-day week to
a four-day week increases juvenile arrests for property crimes, in particular larceny, by
about 80%.
In the third essay, co-authored with Christiana Stoddard, we study the academic
achievement of American Indians. The academic achievement of American Indians
has not been extensively studied. Using NAEP supplements, we find that the average
achievement relative to white students resembles other disadvantaged groups. However,
there are several differences. Family characteristics explain two times as much of the
raw gap as for blacks. School factors also account for a larger portion of the gap than
for blacks or Hispanics. The distribution is also strikingly different: low performing
American Indian students have a substantially larger gap than high performing students.
Finally, racial self-identification is more strongly related to achievement, especially as
American Indian students age.
x
Contents
Acknowledgements v
Curriculum Vitæ vii
Abstract ix
List of Figures xiii
List of Tables xiv
1 The Downside of Good Peers: How Classroom Composition Differentially
Affects Men’s and Women’s STEM Persistence 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.1 Econometric Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.2 The Assignment of Students to Lectures . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.3 Source of Variation in Classmate Ability . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4.1 Sensitivity and Heterogeneity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4.2 Possible Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2 Juvenile Crime and the Four Day School Week 40
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.2 Juvenile Crime and Four-Day School Week Policies . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.2.1 How might the four-day school week impact youth crime? . . 42
2.2.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.2.3 Four-Day School Week Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
xi
2.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.4 Empirical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.5.1 Day-of-the-Week Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.6 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.6.1 Adult Crime and County Placebo Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.6.2 Leads of the Treatment Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3 The Academic Achievement of American Indians 72
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.2 Historical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3 Data and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.4 Mean Differences in Achievement by School Reported Racial Groups . 85
3.5 Racial Gaps at Different points in the Achievement Distribution . . . 87
3.6 Geography, Identity and the Achievement Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.6.1 Effect of Reservations on the American Indian Achievement
Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.6.2 Effect of Self Identification on the Racial Achievement Gap . . 93
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Bibliography 109
Appendices 119
A The Downside of Good Peers: How Classroom Composition Differentially
Affects Men’s and Women’s STEM Persistence 120
B The Academic Achievement of American Indians 126
xii
List of Figures
1.1 Differences in High School GPA Between On-Track and Late-Track . 28
2.1 County Placebo Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.1 Raw Racial and Ethnic Test Score Gaps Relative to White Students in
Same Percentile, weighted by sampling weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
xiii
List of Tables
1.1 On-Tracks are Relatively Higher Achieving than Late-Tracks . . . . . 29
1.2 Summary Statistics (sample includes on-tracks only) . . . . . . . . . 30
1.3 Balance Tests – Are On-Track Students Selectively Enrolling? . . . . . 31
1.4 Balance Tests – Are Late-Track Students Selectively Enrolling? . . . . 32
1.5 The Effect of the Number of On-Track Students on STEM Major Com-
pletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.6 Heterogeneity Analysis – STEM Major Completion for Various Sub-
groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.7 The Effect of the Number of On-Track Students on CHEM1A Grade . 35
1.8 STEM Major Completion – Controls for CHEM1A Grade . . . . . . . 36
1.9 The Effect of the Number of On-Track Students on CHEM1B Enrollment 37
1.10 The Effect of the Number of On-Track Students on CHEM1B Grade . 38
1.11 Where are the Women Going? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.1 Summary Statistics: Rural Counties in Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.2 Poisson Model Base Specification – The Effect of Four-Day Week on
Juvenile Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.3 OLS Base Specification – The Effect of Four-Day Week on Juvenile
Crime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.4 Summary Stats by Day-of-the-Week (NIBRS Offense Data) . . . . . . 63
2.5 Poisson Model Day-of-the-Week Analysis (NIBRS Data) . . . . . . . 64
2.6 OLS Day-of-the-Week Analysis (NIBRS Data) . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.7 Poisson Base Specification for Adult Crime – Robustness Check . . . 66
2.8 OLS Base Specification for Adult Crime – Robustness Check . . . . . 67
2.9 Poisson Model Leads of Treatments – Robustness Check (NIBRS Data) 68
2.10 OLS Leads of Treatments – Robustness Check (NIBRS Data) . . . . . 69
2.11 Poisson Model Base Specification All Counties – Robustness Check . 70
2.12 OLS Base Specification All Counties – Robustness Check . . . . . . . 71
xiv
3.1 Summary Statistics by Race: Means of Student Characteristics by School
Reported Race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.2 Math Standardized Test Score Gaps in Standard Deviation Units . . . 103
3.3 Reading Standardized Test Score Gaps in Standard Deviation Units . . 104
3.4 Standardized Test Score Gaps by Quantile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.5 Standardized Test Score Gaps by Reservation Location . . . . . . . . 106
3.6 Standardized Test Score Gaps by Group Identification . . . . . . . . . 107
3.7 Standardized Test Score Gaps by School Characteristics and Group
Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
A1 STEM Majors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
A2 Balance Test – Orientation Attendees vs. Non-Attendees . . . . . . . 122
A3 Major Composition by Gender (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
A4 Majors by Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
A5 The Effect of the Number of On-Track Students on STEM Major Com-
pletion for Various Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
A1 Summary Statistics by Race: Means of Student Characteristics by Stu-
dent Reported Race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
A2 Standardized Test Score Gaps in Standard Deviation Units at 10-percentile
and 90-percentile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
A3 Standardized Test Score Gaps in Standard Deviation Units by Census
Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
xv
Chapter 1
The Downside of Good Peers: How
Classroom Composition Differentially
Affects Men’s and Women’s STEM
Persistence
1.1 Introduction
Women exit STEM majors at much higher rates than men, which in part contributes
to the gender-wage gap because they miss out on the sizable premiums associated with
employment in these fields.1 To date, little is known regarding why women drop out of
the STEM pipeline in college. Recent research finds that the instructor-student gender
match matters somewhat (Carrell et al. (2010) and Hoffmann and Oreopoulos (2009)),
1Paglin and Rufolo (1990); Murnane et al. (1995); Grogger and Eide (1995); Brown and Corcoran
(1997); Weinberger (1999); Weinberger (2001); Murnane et al. (2000); Rose and Betts (2004)
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and that women’s responsiveness to grades explains some of the phenomenon as well
(Rask and Tiefenthaler (2008) and Ost (2010)), but much remains unexplained. Gain-
ing a better understanding of the factors that cause women to leave STEM fields during
college is important for developing policy aimed at bolstering this group’s STEM per-
sistence. This paper examines a novel pathway: To what extent does the composition
of a woman’s introductory university STEM course impact STEM persistence? By and
large, these courses are large and competitive, and to the extent that women are more
sensitive to these environments, a classroom composition which magnifies these fea-
tures may induce marginal women to leave.
I investigate this question using administrative data from a large public research
university. A unique feature of this particular setting is the quasi-experimental way in
which students are assigned to their first chemistry course, which is a mandatory pre-
requisite for nearly all STEM majors at most universities, and therefore a significant
gateway to success in STEM. Exploiting this quasi-experimental setting, I show that
being in a class with higher ability peers reduces the probability that women graduate
with a STEM degree and has no effect on men. More specifically, a 15% increase in
the number of high ability students in a General Chemistry lecture (one standard devi-
ation) reduces the probability that the average woman graduates with a STEM degree
by 3.1 percentage points (6.8%). As one might expect, I further show that the effect is
strongest in the bottom third of the math ability distribution. I rule out grades in the
same course as the underlying mechanism by showing that there is a positive relation-
ship for both men and women between peer ability and grades in the STEM gateway
course analyzed. These results are informative for at least two reasons. One, they are
the first to show that classmate influences are an important factor in determining stu-
2
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dents’ academic success in higher education, at least for women. Two, in contrast to
most previous work (discussed below), I focus on STEM major completion rather than
grades because STEM completion closely relates to occupation choice, which is an im-
portant piece to the gender wage gap story (Murnane et al. (2000) and Rose and Betts
(2004)).
Very little is known regarding post-secondary classroom composition effects be-
cause isolating the causal impact is difficult. Often students, or more indirectly admin-
istrators, influence the student make-up of a classroom. Several studies at the elemen-
tary school level, which for the most part rely on data from the large scale randomized
experiment Project STAR, find a positive relationship between average classmate abil-
ity and achievement (Whitmore (2005), Hanushek et al. (2003), Boozer and Cacciola
(2001), and Hoxby (2000)). Whether these results extend to a higher education setting,
however, is an open question.
To date, the most convincing peer effects study in higher education – which esti-
mates small positive effects on freshman grade point average – relies on the random
assignment of students from the United States Air Force Academy to squadrons; which
are essentially cohorts (Carrell et al. (2009)).2 This peer group measure is an im-
provement over previous studies, which define dorm-mates as the peer group, because
squadrons capture a more comprehensive set of students’ peer interactions.3 None of
these estimates, however, capture the effects that students within a classroom may have
2Lyle (2007) uses a similar military dataset (USMA) and cohort approach and finds no evidence of
peer effects. A drawback of both of these studies is that students from military institutions likely are not
representative of the general university population, especially women.
3The following studies use the random assignment of students to dorms to estimate peer effects and
find mixed results. Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2006) find small positive peer effects on grades for
women. Zimmerman (2003) and Sacerdote (2001) find small positive peer effects on students’ grades,
grade point average, and the take-up of social networks such as fraternities/sororities. Foster (2006) finds
no evidence of peer effects.
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on individual outcomes because dorm-mates and squadron members do not necessarily
attend the same classes.
There are several ways in which being assigned to a college lecture with relatively
higher ability peers could affect students’ outcomes. On one hand, this type of envi-
ronment could be performance enhancing. Students may benefit directly from higher
ability classmates through knowledge spillovers during class, office hours, or out-of-
class group study sessions. Additionally, the average class ability can affect the class-
room standard and students may be motivated to work harder to keep up with their high
achieving peers, consequently earning higher grades.
On the other hand, a high achieving classroom environment may be harmful in more
subtle ways by negatively impacting self-perception. The higher the ability of the peers
in a classroom, the harder it is to be ranked highly. This may make the environment
more competitive. While in many situations competition can improve performance,
contest theory suggests that large gaps in skills between competitors can have the per-
verse effect of reducing effort incentives. As such, marginal students in this “small fish
in a big pond” environment may feel relatively weaker and either reduce their effort re-
sulting in lower grades in STEM courses or exit the STEM pipeline altogether. Brown
(2011) provides empirical evidence for this theoretical prediction by showing that the
presence of a superstar in a PGA golf tournament is associated with lower performance
by the other competitors. In a related vein, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Gar-
ratt et al. (2013) show that women shy away from competition more than men and that
the gender performance gap is exacerbated under competition (Gneezy et al. (2003)).
These findings suggest that women may be more discouraged by the competitive STEM
climate than men.
4
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At least three aspects of the quasi-experimental nature of this setting make it favor-
able for studying class composition effects. First, the unique no-priority registration
process at this institution leaves little room non-random class enrollment (see Section
3.2). Second, the introductory STEM course General Chemistry is a required prereq-
uisite for most STEM majors and students cannot circumvent the course by apply Ad-
vanced Placement credits eliminating another avenue for selection. Third, the enroll-
ment of upperclassmen into this introductory course generates substantial exogenous
variation in classroom composition (see Section 3.3)
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data.
Section 3 discusses identification and outlines the empirical strategy. Section 4 reports
the results. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Data
All data in this study are drawn from the University of California Santa Barbara
(UCSB) administrative data system. UCSB is a research intensive public university
with a large undergraduate population. These data include all students who are enrolled
in the required introductory university STEM course, General Chemistry (CHEM1A),
in a fall quarter during the years 1997 through 2007, and follows each of them through
graduation. General Chemistry is a particularly favorable setting to study STEM be-
cause at UCSB, and at the majority of other universities, this course is the first prereq-
uisite for most STEM majors4 and tends to be difficult and competitive.5 This gate-
4Appendix Table A1 lists the STEM majors that require CHEM1A.
5One indication of the relative difficulty of the CHEM1A sequence at UCSB, is the large fraction of
campus tutoring services allocated to it. In the academic year 2012-2013, about 25% of all the students
that used the Campus Learning Assistance Services (CLAS) were General Chemistry students.
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way course is a yearlong sequence consisting of CHEM1A, CHEM1B and CHEM1C.6
Moreover, STEM majors at UCSB are required to take the course at the university to
advance to any follow-on courses. Students are not able to apply Advanced Placement
credits to bypass this prerequisite, a strategy that is often used to circumvent introduc-
tory math and statistics.
The data contain two types of students, on-track (freshman) and late-track (sopho-
more or higher). On-track students are defined as taking CHEM1A in the fall quarter of
their first year at the university. Late-track students are upperclassmen taking CHEM1A
in a fall quarter other than their freshman year. Of this sample, roughly 85% of the ob-
servations are on-track students. The other 15% of students are late-track. There are
12,230 on-track students in the sample. Conditional on being a late-track student, 1,291
are upperclassmen who entered the university as freshmen and 621 are transfers. Anec-
dotally, there are several reasons to believe that late-track CHEM1A students differ on
observable and unobservable characteristics from on-track students. First, a portion of
the late-track students are transfers. Transfer students typically come from the local
city college and, on average, have lower high school grades and socioeconomic char-
acteristics. Second, upperclassmen enrolled in CHEM1A, even if they are not transfer
students, are behind schedule in their major since CHEM1A is the gateway course for
almost all other STEM courses/majors. They are either behind because they switched
to a STEM major at some point after their first year or because they needed a year of
preparatory courses – remedial math and science – before taking CHEM1A.
Table 1.1 presents evidence that on-track students are on average higher achieving
than late-track students on observable characteristics. Each column is a separate re-
6CHEM1A is offered in the fall, CHEM1B in the winter and CHEM1C in the spring.
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gression where the outcome is a different predetermined student characteristics. The
variable of interest is a 0-1 indicator for being on-track. Year fixed effects are also in-
cluded in the specification. As reported in Columns 2 and 4, late-track students appear
to have lower high school grade point averages and SAT math scores; two characteris-
tics that are predictors of STEM success. In fact, late-track students on average have
two-thirds of a letter grade lower high school grade point average (see Figure 1.1).
One desirable feature of this dataset is that on-track students (freshmen) face a no-
priority registration policy. On the other hand, late-track students have the ability to
selectively enroll in CHEM1A. To alleviate concerns of possible selection issues on
this margin, I analyze the outcomes of on-track students only. The only way in which
late-track students enter the analysis is through the composition variable (the share of
on-track students per lecture), which is the regressors of interest.7
Table 1.2 presents summary statistics for the main sample, which only includes on-
track students. From 1997-2007 there are 46 CHEM1A lectures taught by 13 different
instructors. The average lecture size is 329 students. On average, on-track students
make up 85% of each lecture; the minimum is 71% and the maximum is 96%.8 The
main outcome of interest is STEM completion, defined as graduating with a STEM
major from UCSB within five years. Among entering freshmen who take CHEM1A, the
average STEM completion rate is 53% for men and 45% for women. Other outcomes
used in this analysis are a student’s grade in CHEM1A, whether a student takes the
direct follow-on course (CHEM1B), and a student’s grade in CHEM1B. The average
CHEM1A grade for males is a 2.65 GPA (on a 4 point scale) and a 2.49 for women.
7While late-track students have the ability to selectively enroll, Table 1.4 shows that the observable
characteristics for this group are orthogonal to class composition. See Section 3.3 for more details.
8If the sample is restricted to exclude CHEM1A lectures with 100 or fewer students, the percent
freshmen per lecture ranges from 75-96%.
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Of all freshmen who take CHEM1A, 85% of men and 80% of women continue on to
CHEM1B where the average grade earned in CHEM1B for men and women is 2.59
and 2.58 respectively.
UCSB administrative data also include several socioeconomic measures: race, sex,
high school grade point average, SAT math and verbal scores, type of high school (pub-
lic or private), parents’ highest education level, English proficiency and age. Limited
information is also available regarding instructors and course times. These include an
instructor’s sex and a unique instructor identification number, as well as the year, day,
and time of the lecture. These data are linked to students.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
1.3.1 Econometric Specification
The primary specification is the following linear probability model:
Gitnd = α1 +β1Fi +β2lnOtnd +β3Fi ∗ lnOtnd +α2Ctnd +α3Xi +α3Mi +φt +ρn + εitnd
(1.1)
The variable Gitnd denotes STEM major completion for an on-track student i who
takes CHEM1A in year t with instructor n at time of day d; tnd uniquely identifies
an individual lecture in a specific year. F is a female indicator variable and Otnd is
the number of on-track students in a specific lecture. The log transformation allows
one to interpret the on-track estimate as a percent change and takes into account that
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a one student change is proportionately larger from a small base.9 The coefficient β2
captures the effect of the number of on-track students per lecture on the outcome for
men. The coefficient on the interaction term F i ∗ lnOtnd is the differential effect of the
number of on-track students per lecture for women. Thus, for women the percentage
point change in STEM graduation associated with a percent increase in the number
of on-track students is β2 + β3. Ctnd controls for several class level characteristics:
the total number of students enrolled in a given lecture and the percent female. The
lecture size variable includes the log of the total number of on-track and late-track
students enrolled in a given lecture. Xi is a vector of student background characteristics
including: race, if a student went to public high school, if English is the only language
spoken in the home, the highest level of education attainment of the parent with the
highest level of education, high school grade point average, SAT math and verbal scores
and age. M indicates that the lecture took place in the morning (starting at 8 a.m. or 9
a.m.). Year fixed effects (φt) are included to control flexibly for time trends in STEM
completion. Since many instructors appear repeatedly, I include instructor fixed effects
(ρn) to control for time-invariant instructor differences. All standard errors are clustered
at the lecture level (instructor/year/time of day).
1.3.2 The Assignment of Students to Lectures
The aim of this study is to understand the differential impact of the number of on-
track students in a general chemistry lecture relative to late-track students on STEM
completion for men and women. In order to interpret βˆ2 and βˆ3 as causal, the vari-
9In alternative specifications, I also use percent of on-track students in a lecture as the measure of
class composition and obtain quantitatively similar results. This measure is less desirable because it
assumes that the marginal effect is constant regardless of the base.
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ation in number and type of on-track students per lecture must be uncorrelated with
unobservable student and instructor characteristics. For example, student preference
for lectures with a certain concentration of on-track students would draw a causal inter-
pretation into question. For my purposes, a primary concern is that βˆ2 and βˆ3 will be
biased if on-track students with similar characteristics systematically enroll in lectures
that have a higher (or lower) share of on-track students. To mitigate possible selection
issues, only students in the fall quarter of their first year are included in the sample;
Hoffmann and Oreopoulos (2009) take a similar approach.10 This sample of students
combined with UCSB’s no-priority freshman enrollment process and the Chemistry
Department’s strictly enforced “no switching” rule leaves little room for selective en-
rollment for freshmen in CHEM1A.
During my sample period, 95% of all first year students attend a fee-based two-
day summer orientation either in June, July or August where they register for their fall
quarter courses.11 Importantly, there is no priority based registration during or before
summer orientation. In each orientation session, a certain percent of the total seats
available in a given “first year” course are made available to that particular orientation
session. This equalizes the probability of enrolling in a certain lecture/course across all
orientation sessions and eliminates the issue of students who attend earlier orientation
dates getting all the “good” classes.
10Freshmen in their first quarter of school have virtually no information about the instructors or class-
room composition since they enroll in their first quarter courses prior to the start of school and they have
very little flexibility in their class schedules to allow them to be strategic in course registration.
11Each summer 12 freshman orientation dates are offered and students can attend the date of their
choice.
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At orientation each student is assigned to a group of 15 students.12 With this group,
students attend seminars about university life and register for their first quarter classes
under the guidance of a trained orientation leader. Only one student in an orientation
group is able to register at a time, as there is only one laptop per group. Within each
group a registration queue is formed by random draw (i.e. creating registration position
1- position 15). The student who draws position 1 registers first. Registration opens at
the same time for all groups within an orientation session. According to the Director of
Orientation Programs and Parent Services at UCSB, the high demand for CHEM1A, the
limited seats, the random registration order, and student’s general lack of information
about instructors makes strategic CHEM1A registration essentially impossible. The
one avenue for selection that one might be concerned with is time of day preferences.
While there is no evidence that this is happening in a differential fashion, all specifi-
cations include controls for time of day. Making selection even harder, the Chemistry
Department strictly enforces an no switching policy. A student can only switch lectures
during the first week of the quarter and he must find a student in his desired lecture to
replace him in his original one: a one for one switch.13
Balance tests for the main sample (entering freshmen cohorts from 1997-2007) are
reported in Table 1.3. Each column in this table corresponds to a separate regression
where a different predetermined student characteristic is regressed on lnOitnd and Fi ∗
lnOitnd . Year fixed effects are also included. If selection is present, the coefficient on
lnOitnd will attain statistical significance. Furthermore, if gender based selection exists,
12Students are placed into orientation groups by declared major, but groups within major are formed
randomly.
13All information regarding freshman orientation and registration comes from an interview with Kim
Equinoa (kim.equinoa@sa.ucsb.edu) who was the director of Orientation Programs and Parent Services
at UCSB during the years in which the data for this analysis are from. Information on the Chemistry
Department’s no switching rule comes from the administrative office within the Chemistry Department.
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i.e. all high achieving women enroll in lectures with a low share of on-track students
while high achieving men enroll in lectures with a high share of on-track students, the
interaction term Fi ∗ lnOitnd will be significant. Although the coefficient on lnOitnd is
statistically significant in some cases, the magnitudes are nearly zero. More importantly
for my purposes, there is even less evidence of a gender differential in selection across
class composition. Fi ∗ lnOitnd is statistically significant in a third of cases but again
the magnitudes are minuscule. For instance, Column 2 shows that SAT math and the
interaction term are positively related, however, the estimated coefficient indicates that
an increase in the log of on-track students in a class of 15% has an additional positive
effect for women of 1.7 SAT math points where the SAT math standard deviation is
approximately 80 points. Not only are these estimates economically insignificant, the
direction works against the main findings of this paper (women’s STEM persistence
and the average class ability are negatively related) as they are a downward bias. Based
on the class composition, there is little evidence that students are selecting into lectures.
The one concern related to student selection that I cannot directly rule out is the
possibility that students who attend summer orientation differ from those who do not.
Students who do not attend summer orientation register for their fall classes in mid-
September prior to the start of the quarter but after all orientation goers have registered.
On-track student estimates will be biased if students who do not attend summer orienta-
tion are non-representative and systematically register for lectures based on the ratio of
on-track to late-track students. If I could observe CHEM1A registration dates I could
do a balance test on observables between students who attend summer orientation and
those who do not. Since these data are unavailable for my sample period, I have instead
obtained registration data for all freshmen enrolled in CHEM1A in fall 2013. Although
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these students are not in my main sample, the registration behavior should be similar,
as the general structure of freshman registration is similar.
For this group of students – all freshmen enrolled in CHEM1A in fall of 2013
– I observe their CHEM1A registration date and time as well as demographics and
CHEM1A instructor characteristics. Ninety percent of this sample attended a sum-
mer orientation/registration (slightly lower than the main sample). Comparing the ob-
servable characteristics of students who attend orientation and those who do not, the
only group who is underrepresented in orientation attendance is underrepresented mi-
norities; 38% of the orientation attending group are URMs compared to 49% of the
non-orientation attending group. There appears to be no selection into orientation at-
tendance by gender, parent’s education level, whether one has a high school GPA in
the top half of the distribution for the sample, whether one scores in the top half of the
SAT math or SAT verbal distribution for the sample, type of high school one attended,
and English language learner status. Most importantly, the data indicate that there is
no statistically significant difference in the share of on-track students in a lecture or
begin time of the lecture for those who attend summer orientation and those who do
not. Appendix Table A2 reports these results.
1.3.3 Source of Variation in Classmate Ability
The approach used to identify classroom composition effects in this study is sim-
ilar to that of Hoxby (2000). She estimates classroom peer effects among elementary
age students by exploiting plausibly random variation in the gender and racial compo-
sition within a given grade and school over time. I exploit exogenous variation in the
ability composition across CHEM1A lectures within a year and over time. Variation
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in CHEM1A classroom composition is driven by late-track student enrollment patters.
Late-track students register for fall classes the previous spring, before on-track enroll-
ment. Based on estimated freshmen fall enrollment, the university holds a fraction of
the CHEM1A seats in each lecture for incoming freshmen; in some cases late-track
students fill all of the seats allotted to them in a given lecture and in other cases they do
not.
For instance, suppose for simplicity that there are 4 lectures and each has a maxi-
mum enrollment of 100. Further suppose that 30 percent of the seats (30 seats in this
case) in each lecture in a given year are made available to late-track students. If in one
of the lectures all 30 seats are filled, in the second only 25 are filled, and in the third
and fourth only 20 and 15 respectively are taken, then variation will arise in the num-
ber of late-track students. The second stage of the process is that on-track students are
assigned (virtually at random) to the remaining seats. Although in theory late-track stu-
dents have the ability to select into specific lectures which is why I don’t analyze their
outcomes, the balance test reported in Table 1.4 show no sign this group is selecting
into lectures based on the composition of the class. There is some evidence that better
late-track students select morning lectures but, importantly for this paper’s empirical
approach, time of day is uncorrelated with the share of on-track students.
1.4 Results
Results from the main specification (Equation 1) – which estimates the differential
impact of the number of on-track students in a class for men and women – are reported
in Table 5. Column 1 of Table A5 reports results for the full sample and shows that
14
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increasing the number of on-track students in a class by 15% reduces the probability
that a woman graduates with a STEM major by 3.1 percentage points (see Column 1,
panel B). Increasing the number of on-track students by 15% in the average class is
equivalent to adding 44 more on-track students to a class with 281 on-track students,
which is about one standard deviation. To give context to the magnitude of the results,
the average STEM graduation rate for women is 45% and 53% for men. Thus, a 15%
increase in the number of on-tracks student in a lecture decreases the STEM graduation
rate for an average woman from 45% to about 42%, which is a decrease of 6.6%. For
men, Column 1 suggests that there is no statistically significant relationship between
the ability of the students in his CHEM1A lecture and the rate at which he persists in
STEM.14
While the aim of this analysis is to understand the total effect of a student’s class-
mates on that student’s STEM outcomes, it is worth noting that in theory the total
estimated composition effect can embody three distinct effects; exogenous peer effects
(also known as contextual effects), endogenous peer effects, and correlated effects. Cor-
related effects are present when individuals in the same group behave similarly because
they have similar individual characteristics (Moffitt et al. (2001)). This is often caused
by students self-selecting into a group. The random assignment of students to lec-
tures ensures that the composition estimates are free of correlated effects. Exogenous
peer effects arise when a student’s classmates’ predetermined observable characteristics
(high school grade point average, SAT scores etc.) affect her outcomes. Endogenous
peer effects are present when a student’s classmates’ outcomes affect her outcome. For
14I re-run Equation 1 using a probit model rather than a linear probability model and obtain similar
results. I also use percent on-track students in the class as well as number of on-track students in the
class rather than natural log of the number of on-track students and obtain similar results.
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instance, although in practice this seems rather unlikely, if a student’s classmates’ de-
cision to remain in STEM affects her decision to stay, then the composition estimates
in this study will capture not only the the exogenous effect but also this endogenous
effect.15 That said, although in the peer effects literature it is often the goal of the em-
piricists to solve the reflection problem which involves isolating the exogenous effect
net of the other two effects, in this this study I am interested in learning how class-
mates’ affect a student’s STEM completion. As such, my composition estimates are
capturing this total effect and the presence of an endogenous effect does not undermine
the empirical findings.
1.4.1 Sensitivity and Heterogeneity Analysis
One factor that threatens the causal interpretation of these results is student assign-
ment to lectures with a particular composition based on characteristics that correlate
with student STEM persistence. Although a balance tests reveal that students are sta-
tistically similar on observables across classes (Table 1.3), lectures added at the last
minute to meet a larger than expected CHEM1A demand are a particular concern.16
The data do not allow one to specifically identify whether a class is added at the last
minute, however, the very small lectures (i.e. those with fewer than 100 students) are
likely to be the added course if one exists. Importantly, these very small lectures also
appear to be correlated with the percent of on-track students in the class. The average
15If one believes that endogenous effects are present and assuming that both the exogenous and en-
dogenous effects are negative, my estimate of the “total effect” will overestimate the exogenous effect.
That is, the estimate will be inflated by a social multiplier, which is commonly known as the reflection
problem, and be more negative than the true exogenous effect.
16 Although many years the Chemistry Department accurately estimates the demand for CHEM1A,
there are cases where they add an additional lecture the week before the fall term begins.
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percent of on-track students for these lectures is 72 compared to 86% for the entire sam-
ple. It is also the case that on-track students assigned to these smaller add-on lectures
have the greatest potential to be non-representative. For instance, the small percent of
on-track students who do not attend a summer orientation/registration session and also
enroll in CHEM1A (which is on average 5% percent of an incoming freshman class)
are most likely assigned to an add-on lecture during the first week of school. One would
expect this non-summer orientation attending group of students to be less advantaged,
thereby dampening the estimated on-track student effect found in the main specifica-
tion.17 Column 2 of Table 5 reports the estimates for the subsample which excludes
lectures with fewer than 100 students; variation in percent on-track student per lecture
ranges from 75 to 96%.18 Results for this subsample indicate that potential add-on lec-
tures are not driving the main findings. In fact, the magnitude of the estimated on-track
student effects for women and men are not statistically different from the estimated
effects using the whole sample.
Additionally, understanding which group of students is driving the main result is
important for developing and implementing interventions. Columns 3-5 of Table 1.6
report results disaggregated by SAT math score. The effect is strongest for women in
the bottom third of the SAT math distribution. A 15% increase in the number of on-track
students in a class reduces the probability by 5.7 percentage points that a women in this
SAT math group completes college with a degree in STEM, and this effect is statistically
different from the estimated effects in the other two SAT categories (Columns 4 and 5).
Consistent with the main finding, the men in all subsamples appear to be unaffected
17Non-orientation attending students are likely less advantaged because summer orientation is an ad-
ditional cost. According to UCSB office of Orientation Programs and Parent Services, the most common
reason students do not attend orientation is due to summer employment.
18A balancing test for the subsample is statistically the same as the balancing test for the main sample.
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by the classroom composition. While it is intuitive that women in the lower part of
the math ability distribution are the group most affected by classroom composition
since they are the group most at risk of dropping out of STEM, these results oppose
the findings in Carrel et al. (2010). They find that the group influenced by STEM
interventions are women at the top of the SAT math distribution. In particular, they
document that women in the top 25% of the SAT math distribution with female STEM
instructors are more likely to graduate with a STEM major.
One might wonder if the results truly are a gender effect. It is possible that I am
capturing an underrepresented minority effect or merely picking up the fact that all
students at the bottom end of the SAT math distribution are less likely to graduate with
a degree in STEM. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 report results from the specifications
outlined in Equations 2 and 3 respectively. These models, which are extensions of
equation (1), include a triple interaction term allowing one to disentangle differences
in the on-track student effect across gender and race (Column 1), as well as gender and
position in the SAT math distribution (Column 2).
Gitnd =α1+β1Fi+β2lnOtnd +β3URMi+β4Fi∗URMi+β5lnOtnd ∗URMi+β6Fi∗lnOtnd+
(1.2)
β7Fi ∗URMi ∗ lnOi +α2Ctnd +α3Xi +α3Mi +φt +ρn + εitnd
Gitnd =α1+β1Fi+β2lnOtnd +β3Lowi+β4Fi∗Lowi+β5lnOtnd ∗Lowi+β6Fi∗ lnOtnd+
(1.3)
β7Fi ∗Lowi ∗ lnOi +α2Ctnd +α3Xi +α3Mi +φt +ρn + εitnd
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URMi denotes whether a student is an underrepresented minority (black, Hispanic,
American Indian or Filipino) and Lowi indicates whether a student falls in the bottom
third of the SAT math distribution for the sample in a given year. All other variables
are as defined in Section 3. Column 1 shows that all women, regardless of race, have
STEM persistence rates that are negatively affected by the number of on-track students
in her CHEM1A class. As reported in Column 1 Panel B, URM and non-URM women
experience a 3.0 percentage point decline in STEM persistence as a result of an in-
creased number of on-track students. Again, there is no detectable class composition
effect for men, URM or non-URM.
Results presented in Table 6 Column 2 further support a gender story. These results
show that only women (and not men) in the bottom third of the SAT math distribution
for the sample have STEM persistence rates that are affected. In fact, women in this
group are 4.0 percentage points less likely to graduate in STEM as a result of a 15%
increase in the number of on-track students in a class. The results for the women are
statistically different from zero and statistically different from men in this same SAT
math group.
Gitnd = α1+β1Fi+β2lnOtnd +β3Bi+β4Fi ∗Bi+β5lnOtnd ∗Bi+β6Fi ∗ lnOtnd+ (1.4)
β7Fi ∗Lowi ∗ lnOi +α2Ctnd +α3Xi +α3Mi +φt +ρi + εitnd
Finally, socioeconomic status may also play a role in one’s willingness to leave
STEM when placed in a lecture with a higher share of on-track students. I use a similar
triple difference specification – as outlined in Equation 4 – and examine the differential
effect of on-track concentration on STEM persistence by gender and by parent’s level
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of education. Bi indicates if a student has at least one parent with a bachelor’s degree.
Results presented in Column 3 of Table 6 show that all women, regardless of whether
her parent is a college graduate, have an increased probability of exiting STEM. Con-
sistent with all other specifications, the persistence rate for men in all subgroups seems
to be statistically unrelated to the composition of the class. Together, these findings
provide strong evidence that women in the bottom third of the math ability distribution
are the group most affected by the ability of their classmates. There is no evidence to
support the conjecture that it is merely reflecting minority status, being in the bottom
of the ability distribution, or socioeconomic status.
1.4.2 Possible Mechanisms
These reported findings raise the question: Why are women in the bottom third of
the math ability distribution less likely to graduate with a STEM degree if their first
experience with STEM is in a setting with higher ability classmates, and why are men
unaffected by this factor? Because little is known regarding post-secondary classroom
composition effects and student outcomes in general, less is known about the mech-
anisms at work, and in particular why composition matters more for women. One
relevant study – a project funded by the National Science Foundation and conducted by
the Goodman Research Group – surveyed roughly 25,000 undergraduate women en-
rolled in engineering programs across 53 institutions between 1999-2001 with the goal
of identifying “.. aspects of women’s educational experiences that are critical to their
retention in engineering.” Although engineering students comprise only a small part
of the greater group of women in STEM, lessons learned from the engineering study
likely have some relevance for other STEM areas since many early prerequisites are
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common across STEM majors. This study finds that women who leave engineering
are most likely to leave in their freshman or sophomore year. The top two reasons for
leaving are: (1) they are dissatisfied with their grades and/or the heavy workload, and
(2) they dislike the overall climate of the major, including the competitive nature and
discouraging faculty and peers. Both of these factors may be directly influenced by the
class composition.
Grades
First, I investigate grades in the initial course as a possible mechanism. In addition
to the study by the Goodman Research Group, several studies in economics find that
women are more responsive to grades than men, and as a result exit STEM majors.19
If all CHEM1A classes are graded on a similar curve (i.e. 10 percent of the class
earns an A grade, 35 percent earns a B grade etc.), then students in lectures with more
high ability classmates will receive lower grades relative to their counterpart (those
in lectures with fewer on-track students). For instance, suppose that there are two
CHEM1A lectures with equal enrollment in a given fall quarter and one has more on-
track students than the other. Relying on the fact that lectures with more on-track
students are overall higher ability (Table 1.1), then a student receiving a score of 77%
in the lecture with more on-track students will be assigned a lower final letter grade
than if she was in a class with fewer on-track students.
To explore this possibility, I use a specification similar to Equation 1 with a student’s
CHEM1A grade as the outcome. CHEM1A grade is a variable taking on values from
19The average grade in STEM courses is much lower than humanities, social sciences, arts and inter-
disciplinary courses. Rask and Tiefenthaler (2008) and Ost (2010) show that women in STEM are more
responsive to grades than men.
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0 to 4. If grades are the underlying mechanism, students in classes with more on-
track peers should receive lower final grades. The results presented in column 1 of
Table 1.7, however, show no sign of this. In fact, both men and women experience a
bump in CHEM1A grade as a result of an increase in the number of on-track students in
a class. Columns 2-7 further show that this result is robust to a variety of subsamples.
It appears that all students – male, female, URM, non-URM, the low SAT math scoring
group and high SAT math scoring group – experience a marginal increase in their grade.
These results are also robust to the subsample which excludes lectures with fewer than
100 students. Quantile regression results (available upon request) further reveal that a
positive effect is detectable at all places in the distribution for both men and women
which suggests that the overall grade distribution for classes with a higher share of
on-track students is shifted to the right. Moreover, if grades are driving the result,
controlling for CHEM1A grade in the main specification (Equation 1) should diminish
the composition estimates. Table 1.8 reports such estimates and shows that the effect
remains despite controlling for initial course grade, and the differential effect persists
as well.
It is possible that the grade findings are a result of positive peer effects as it has been
shown that higher ability peer groups elicit higher individual grades (Stinebrickner and
Stinebrickner (2006); Han and Li (2009); Zimmerman (2003); Sacerdote (2001); Car-
rell et al. (2009)). Given the structure of the data, however, I cannot rule out that the
positive grade effect is merely an artifact of instructors adjusting their grade scales
based on the overall ability of the students. For instance, positive effects will emerge if
instructors increase everyone’s grade in a class because on-whole they are high achiev-
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ing; a channel that instructor fixed effects will not capture because this behavior is
time-varying.
Course Climate
General Chemistry is competitive and women, when given the option, are more
likely to select out of competitive environments (Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), Gar-
ratt et al. (2013)). The competitive environment in the introductory chemistry course
comes from at least three source, (1) the course is required for most STEM majors and
students are required to keep a “C” average in the introductory sequence to advance
to upper division courses, (2) because many STEM majors are graduate school and
medical school prerequisites, students are motivated to maintain a high grade point av-
erage, and (3) grades are assigned based on a curve. Increasing the share of high ability
students therefore increases competition in an already competitive environment.
Additionally, the composition of the class could affect students’ self-perception
about their immediate and future success in the major. Presumably, all students enter
the initial course with an expectation about how they will do. Throughout the course
they learn about their relative standing and update beliefs about themselves accord-
ingly. Individuals in lectures with relativity higher ability classmates may adjust these
believes differently than those who are not. For example, Pop-Eleches and Urquiola
(2011) show that students who just make it into better high schools receive a bump in
exam scores but also report feeling marginalized and relatively weaker compared to
students who are placed in classes with lower ability classmates. To the extent that
women’s self-perception about their future success is more negatively affected by the
ability of those around them, it could explain their much lower retention rate. Along
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these lines, if women are more risk averse, then the marginal women may switch to
majors where they perceive having a higher chance of “making it” while marginal men
gamble by staying in STEM. Consistent with this idea, Kuziemko et al. (2014) show
that men are more likely to gamble to avoid low rank whereas women accept it.20
There are many reasons to believe that women might be turned off by the climate
in STEM while men are not. As a result, marginal women may become discouraged
and either exert lower effort or quit STEM altogether. Some evidence supporting the
idea that women become discouraged is in the take-up of the direct follow-on course,
CHEM1B. Twenty percent of women exit the general chemistry sequence after the
initial course compared to 15% of men and some of this is attributable to the composi-
tion of the introductory course. Table 1.9 reports results for a linear probability model
similar to Equation 1 where the outcome is equal to one if a student takes CHEM1B
and zero otherwise. This table shows that women’s and men’s CHEM1B take-up is
unrelated to CHEM1A classroom composition for the whole sample (Column 1), but
when broken out by SAT math subgroups the results indicate that CHEM1B take-up
for women in the bottom third of the SAT math distribution – which is the group with
STEM major completion most affected by classroom composition – is negatively re-
lated to the number of on-track students in a class (Column 5). The estimated effect
is statistically different from zero and statistically different from the effect for men in
this same group, but due to the noisy estimates in the other subsamples, I cannot reject
that the effect for women is the same as the estimated effects for women from the other
20Although data for this study comes from the laboratory and manipulates an individual’s rank in the
wealth distribution, it is reasonable that the detected behavioral response extends to a classroom ability
distribution.
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SAT math groups (the middle third and the top third). These results are robust to a
specification that controls for CHEM1A grade as well.
Next, I estimate a small negative relationship between number of on-track students
and CHEM1B grade for women and find no statistically significant effect for men (Ta-
ble 1.10, Column 1). An increase in the number of on-track students of 15% is related
to a reduction in a woman’s CHEM1B grade of 0.08 grade points which is 27% of a
letter grade. Consider this estimate understated (less negative than one would expect)
because some students – particularly those near the bottom of the ability distribution,
see Table 1.9 – have already exited the pipeline as a result of the introductory class
composition and are no longer in the sample. It is very likely that this follow-on grade
finding reflects a student’s overall discouraged feeling – i.e. lack of effort – particularly
if she feels marginalized in the introductory course. It is also possible that learning or
mastering the fundamental skills needed to successfully complete a STEM degree is
lower for women in introductory classes with higher quality students. However, this
later explanation, is not supported in my data, as I find a positive relationship between
the ability composition in a classroom and CHEM1A grade for women.
Finally, I show that women are responding to the composition of their introductory
course by switching into majors that are relatively less quantitative.21 Table 1.11, Col-
umn 2 reports that increasing the number of on-track students in a class by 15% leads to
3.3 percentage point increase in the probability that a woman graduates with a humani-
ties, social sciences, art, or interdisciplinary major.22 This table shows that women are
21Appendix Table A3 outlines by sex the percent of students in each major category at entry and at
graduation.
22I get similar results when I exclude Economics (Econ, Econ-Math, and Econ-Accounting) and Psy-
chology from this group.
25
Chapter 1. The Downside of Good Peers: How Classroom Composition Differentially
Affects Men’s and Women’s STEM Persistence
still graduating (as shown in column 3) but on average they are graduating in majors
that are, lower paying, less quantitative and arguably less competitive.
Although I can not directly point to the channel by which high ability classmates
adversely affect women’s STEM retention, I can rule out that the effect is operating
through grades. There are, however, various other channels through which the climate
may discourage women including competition, self-perception and risk aversion. Con-
sistent with this notion, I show that women both directly after the initial course and
at other points in their STEM major pursuit give-up on STEM as a response to the
share of high ability classmates, in favor of majors that have a more female friendly
environment.
1.5 Discussion and Conclusion
It has been well documented that women are less likely than men to persist in STEM
majors and careers. This study targets a unique group of students, those taking General
Chemistry in their first quarter of college, to better understand how one’s first colle-
giate experience in STEM explains STEM major graduation rates. Relying on data
containing roughly 12,000 first year university students from 11 entering cohorts be-
tween 1997-2007, I estimate how the ability of one’s classmates, as measured by the
share of on-track students per class, in a required STEM major course affects a student’s
STEM major completion.
In summary, women who are assigned to a STEM lecture with higher ability peers
early in their university career are less likely to persist in STEM. I show that this result
is driven by women in the bottom third of the SAT math distribution. Men in this same
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SAT bracket (or any subsample for that matter) do not experience this same negative
relationship between classmate ability and STEM persistence.
I have ruled out the possibility that women earn lower grades in classes with higher
achieving classmates and as such are less likely to persist. The number of on-track
students per class and grades in the initial course are positively related. On the other
hand, I cannot rule out the possibility that women’s decision to exit is a response to the
climate created in classes with higher ability peers. In fact, I find some evidence consis-
tent with a story that marginal women are deterred by the climate, become discouraged,
and eventually exit to majors with a more female friendly environment. I show that at
least some of these women are leaving the STEM pipeline immediately after the initial
General Chemistry course, as a share of them do not persist to the direct follow-on as a
result of the ability of their classmates in the initial course.
This study is the first to provide an analysis of the relationship between class com-
position and STEM degree completion in higher education, and to document the dif-
ferential response by gender. Although these estimates do not provide direct policy
implications, they do reveal (1) an important group for policy to target, and (2) suggest
that, for women, a behavioral response may be present. Thus, if the goal of policy is to
bolster the participation of women in STEM fields, deepening our understanding of the
channels through which classmates affect a woman’s STEM behavior is important.
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Figure 1.1: Differences in High School GPA Between On-Track and Late-Track
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Table 1.1: On-Tracks are Relatively Higher Achieving than Late-Tracks
On-Track Late-Track Diff. (1) - (2)
(1) (2) (3)
Student Background Characteristics
Women 0.49 0.52 -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
URM (underrepresented minority) 0.32 0.32 0.01
(0.47) (0.47) (0.01)
High school grade point average 3.75 3.52 0.23***
(0.32) (0.44) (0.01)
SAT math score 612.74 604.34 8.40***
(80.84) (80.95) (2.25)
SAT verbal score 569.58 575.91 -6.34***
(84.59) (83.66) (2.33)
Attended public high school 0.85 0.86 -0.01
(0.36) (0.35) (0.01)
English is only language spoken in home 0.67 0.69 -0.02*
(0.47) (0.46) (0.01)
No parent graduated from college 0.33 0.30 0.03***
(0.47) (0.46) (0.01)
Outcomes
Graduate with STEM major 0.49 0.44 0.06***
(0.50) (0.50) (0.01)
Graduate 0.81 0.82 -0.014
(0.40) (0.38) (0.01)
CHEM1A grade 2.57 2.26 0.31***
(0.93) (1.11) (0.03)
Took follow-on course (CHEM1B) 0.83 0.63 0.20***
(0.38) (0.48) (0.01)
Grade in follow-on course (CHEM1B) 2.58 2.53 0.05*
(0.87) (0.97) (0.03)
Observations 12,230 1,935 14,165
Notes: On-track students are enrolled in the first quarter of General Chemistry (CHEM1A) in the fall quarter of their
freshman year at UCSB from 1997 to 2007. Late-track students are enrolled in CHEM1A during this time frame but are
taking the course as an upperclassman or transfer student. URM stands for underrepresented minorities and includes all
race categories except white, Asian and Indian. Level of significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics (sample includes on-tracks only)
Women Men
(1) (2)
Classroom Characteristics
% on-track in a lecture 0.85 0.85
(0.05) (0.05)
CHEM1A lecture size 329.37 328.53
(46.73) (47.37)
Student Background Characteristics
URM (underrepresented minority) 0.34 0.31
(0.47) (0.46)
High school grade point average 3.80 3.70
(0.31) (0.33)
SAT math score 587.59 636.41
(78.16) (75.49)
SAT verbal score 564.88 573.97
(82.63) (85.60)
Attended public high school 0.86 0.84
(0.35) (0.37)
English is only language spoken in home 0.69 0.65
(0.46) (0.48)
No parent graduated from college 0.36 0.29
(0.48) (0.46)
Outcomes
Graduate with STEM major 0.45 0.53
(0.50) (0.50)
Graduate 0.82 0.80
(0.39) (0.40)
CHEM1A grade 2.49 2.65
(0.95) (0.91)
Took follow-on course (CHEM1B) 0.80 0.85
(0.40) (0.36)
Grade in follow-on course (CHEM1B) 2.58 2.59
(0.87) (0.87)
Observations 5,942 6,288
Notes: The sample includes only on-track students, those enrolled in the first quarter of
General Chemistry (CHEM1A) in the fall quarter of their freshman year at UCSB between
the years 1997 and 2007. URM stands for underrepresented minorities and includes all race
categories except white, Asian and Indian.
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Table 1.6: Heterogeneity Analysis – STEM Major Completion for Various Subgroups
URM Effect? Low Ability Effect? Low SES Effect?
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Point Estimates
Ln(no. of on-track) -0.096 -0.116 -0.143
(0.114) (0.106) (0.119)
Ln(no. of on-track) X Fem. -0.125** 0.802* -0.087
(0.060) (0.472) (0.070)
Ln(no. of on-track) X URM -0.050
(0.070)
Ln(no. of on-track) X Fem. X URM 0.033
(0.101)
Ln(no. of on-track)X bottom 1/3 0.013
(0.064)
Ln(no. of on-track) X Fem. X bottom 1/3 -0.144*
(0.084)
Ln(no. of on-track) X Parent col. grad 0.054
(0.063)
Ln(no. of on-track) X Fem. X Parent col. grad -0.042
(0.087)
Panel B: Estimated effects in
%-pts. associated with a 15%
increase in no. of on-track
Non-URM – women -3.10**
Non-URM – men -1.30
URM – women -3.30**
URM – men -2.00
Bottom 1/3 – women -4.00**
Bottom 1/3 – men -1.40
Top 2/3 – women -2.00
Top 2/3 – men -1.60
Col. grad parent – women -3.00**
Col. grad parent – men -1.20
No col. grad parent – women -3.20**
No col. grad parent – men -2.10
Observations 12,230 12,230 12,230
Note: Each column is a separate specification. The Column 1 regression also includes a dummy for URM and an interaction term between URM and
woman. URM stands for underrepresented minorities and includes all race categories except white, Asian and Indian. The Column 2 regression also
includes a dummy for being in the bottom 1/3 of the SAT math distribution and the interaction between being in the bottom and a woman. The Column
3 regression also includes a dummy for having at least one parent with a college degree and the interaction between being that dummy and woman.
Additionally, all three regressions include controls for percent female in a class, class size, year and instructor fixed effects, whether the lecture was
held in the morning, a vector of student background characteristics, and a student’s declared major at entry. Student background characteristics include:
gender, race (black, Hispanic, Asian, American Indian, Filipino, Indian and white is the omitted group), if a student went to public high school, if
English is the only language spoken in the home, the highest level of education attainment of the parent with the highest level of education, high school
grade point average, SAT math and verbal scores and age. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses , *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clusters are by
CHEM1A lecture (class). A 15% increase in number of on-track students in a class is the equivalent of increasing the number of on-track students by
about 1 standard deviation (44 students).
34
Chapter 1. The Downside of Good Peers: How Classroom Composition Differentially
Affects Men’s and Women’s STEM Persistence
Ta
bl
e
1.
7:
T
he
E
ff
ec
to
ft
he
N
um
be
ro
fO
n-
Tr
ac
k
St
ud
en
ts
on
C
H
E
M
1A
G
ra
de
Fu
ll
Sa
m
pl
e
L
ec
tu
re
s
>
10
0
N
on
-U
R
M
s
U
R
M
s
B
ot
to
m
1/
3
M
id
dl
e
1/
3
To
p
1/
3
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
Pa
ne
lA
:P
oi
nt
E
st
im
at
es
L
n(
no
.o
fo
n-
tr
ac
k)
0.
83
1*
0.
85
6*
0.
79
9*
1.
00
5*
1.
37
6*
*
0.
89
3*
*
0.
76
6*
(0
.4
41
)
(0
.4
47
)
(0
.4
31
)
(0
.5
46
)
(0
.6
10
)
(0
.4
16
)
(0
.4
53
)
L
n(
no
.o
fo
n-
tr
ac
k)
X
Fe
m
.
0.
02
9
0.
00
5
0.
03
6
0.
01
0
-0
.0
79
-0
.0
92
0.
12
1
(0
.0
68
)
(0
.1
25
)
(0
.0
87
)
(0
.1
11
)
(0
.0
92
)
(0
.1
19
)
(0
.1
48
)
In
st
ru
ct
or
,Y
ea
r,
Ti
m
e
of
da
y
FE
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
St
ud
en
tC
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Pa
ne
lB
:E
st
im
at
ed
ef
fe
ct
si
n
%
-p
ts
.a
ss
oc
ia
te
d
w
ith
a
15
%
in
cr
ea
se
in
no
.o
fo
n-
tr
ac
k
(0
.3
gr
ad
e
po
in
ts
=
1
le
tt
er
gr
ad
e)
W
om
en
0.
12
*
0.
12
*
0.
11
*
0.
14
*
0.
18
**
0.
11
**
0.
12
**
M
en
0.
12
*
0.
12
*
0.
11
*
0.
14
*
0.
19
**
0.
13
**
0.
11
*
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
12
,2
30
12
,1
22
8,
28
1
3,
94
9
4,
20
6
3,
43
8
4,
58
6
N
ot
e:
E
ac
h
co
lu
m
n
is
a
se
pa
ra
te
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n.
“B
ot
to
m
1/
3”
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
bo
tto
m
1/
3
of
th
e
SA
T
m
at
h
di
st
ri
bu
tio
n.
“M
id
dl
e
1/
3”
an
d
“T
op
1/
3”
re
fe
rt
o
th
e
m
id
dl
e
1/
3
an
d
to
p
1/
3
of
th
e
SA
T
m
at
h
di
st
ri
bu
tio
n
fo
rt
he
cl
as
s
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
C
on
tr
ol
s
in
cl
ud
e
pe
rc
en
tf
em
al
e
in
a
cl
as
s,
lo
g
cl
as
s
si
ze
,y
ea
ra
nd
in
st
ru
ct
or
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
s,
w
he
th
er
th
e
le
ct
ur
e
w
as
he
ld
in
th
e
m
or
ni
ng
,a
ve
ct
or
of
st
ud
en
tb
ac
kg
ro
un
d
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s,
an
d
a
st
ud
en
t’s
de
cl
ar
ed
m
aj
or
at
en
tr
y.
St
ud
en
tb
ac
kg
ro
un
d
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
in
cl
ud
e:
ge
nd
er
,r
ac
e
(b
la
ck
,H
is
pa
ni
c,
A
si
an
,A
m
er
ic
an
In
di
an
,
Fi
lip
in
o,
In
di
an
an
d
w
hi
te
is
th
e
om
itt
ed
gr
ou
p)
,i
f
a
st
ud
en
tw
en
tt
o
pu
bl
ic
hi
gh
sc
ho
ol
,i
f
E
ng
lis
h
is
th
e
on
ly
la
ng
ua
ge
sp
ok
en
in
th
e
ho
m
e,
th
e
hi
gh
es
tl
ev
el
of
ed
uc
at
io
n
at
ta
in
m
en
to
f
th
e
pa
re
nt
w
ith
th
e
hi
gh
es
tl
ev
el
of
ed
uc
at
io
n,
hi
gh
sc
ho
ol
gr
ad
e
po
in
ta
ve
ra
ge
,S
A
T
m
at
h
an
d
ve
rb
al
sc
or
es
an
d
ag
e.
C
lu
st
er
ed
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
,*
**
p<
0.
01
,*
*
p<
0.
05
,
*
p<
0.
1.
C
lu
st
er
s
ar
e
by
C
H
E
M
1A
le
ct
ur
e
(c
la
ss
).
A
15
%
in
cr
ea
se
in
nu
m
be
r
of
on
-t
ra
ck
st
ud
en
ts
in
a
cl
as
s
is
th
e
eq
ui
va
le
nt
of
in
cr
ea
si
ng
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
on
-t
ra
ck
st
ud
en
ts
by
ab
ou
t1
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
(4
4
st
ud
en
ts
).
U
R
M
st
an
ds
fo
ru
nd
er
re
pr
es
en
te
d
m
in
or
iti
es
an
d
in
cl
ud
es
al
lr
ac
e
ca
te
go
ri
es
ex
ce
pt
w
hi
te
,A
si
an
an
d
In
di
an
.
35
Chapter 1. The Downside of Good Peers: How Classroom Composition Differentially
Affects Men’s and Women’s STEM Persistence
Table 1.8: STEM Major Completion – Controls for CHEM1A
Grade
Full Sample Lectures > 100
(1) (2)
Panel A: Point Estimates
Ln(no. of on-track) -0.256* -0.185
(0.140) (0.139)
Ln(no. of on-track) X Fem. -0.117*** -0.138***
(0.034) (0.053)
CHEM1A Grade 0.169*** 0.169***
(0.005) (0.005)
Instructor, Year, Time of day FE X X
Student Characteristics X X
Panel B: Estimated effects in
%-pts. associated with a 15%
increase in no. of on-track
Women -5.20*** -4.50**
Men -3.60* -2.60
Observations 12,230 12,122
Note: Each column is a separate specification. Controls include percent female in a class,
log class size, year and instructor fixed effects, whether the lecture was held in the morning,
a vector of student background characteristics, and a student’s declared major at entry. Stu-
dent background characteristics include: gender, race (black, Hispanic, Asian, American
Indian, Filipino, Indian and white is the omitted group), if a student went to public high
school, if English is the only language spoken in the home, the highest level of education
attainment of the parent with the highest level of education, high school grade point aver-
age, SAT math and verbal scores and age. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses , ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clusters are by CHEM1A lecture (class). A 15% increase in
number of on-track students in a class is the equivalent of increasing the number of on-track
students by about 1 standard deviation (44 students). URM stands for underrepresented
minorities and includes all race categories except white, Asian and Indian.
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Table 1.11: Where are the Women Going?
Graduate in Non-STEM Graduate
(1) (2)
Panel A: Point Estimates
Ln(no. of on-track) 1.22 -0.035
(0.099) (0.113)
Ln(no. of on-track) X Fem. 0.107*** -0.074*
(0.030) (0.038)
Instructor, Year, Time of day FE X X
Student Characteristics X X
Panel B: Estimated effects in
%-pts. associated with a 15%
increase in no. of on-track
Women 3.20** -0.50
Men 1.70 -1.50
Observations 12,230 12,230
Note: Each column is a separate specification. Controls include percent female in a class, log class
size, year and instructor fixed effects, whether the lecture was held in the morning, a vector of student
background characteristics, and a student’s declared major at entry. Student background character-
istics include: gender, race (black, Hispanic, Asian, American Indian, Filipino, Indian and white is
the omitted group), if a student went to public high school, if English is the only language spoken in
the home, the highest level of education attainment of the parent with the highest level of education,
high school grade point average, SAT math and verbal scores and age. Clustered standard errors
are in parentheses , *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clusters are by CHEM1A lecture (class). A
15% increase in number of on-track students in a class is the equivalent of increasing the number
of on-track students by about 1 standard deviation (44 students). URM stands for underrepresented
minorities and includes all race categories except white, Asian and Indian.
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Chapter 2
Juvenile Crime and the Four Day
School Week
2.1 Introduction
The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention reports that the majority
of juvenile crimes are committed during non-school hours; they peak between 3 p.m.
and 6 p.m. (Snyder and Sickmund, 2006). This fact has led to the common perception
that lengthening the time students are in school, or increasing funds to expand youth
programs, will reduce youth crime. The idea is that students who might engage in
criminal activity are deprived of these opportunities when they are supervised. How-
ever, the extent to which school or youth program participation changes youth crime,
if at all, remains an open question. Establishing a causal link between school atten-
dance and youth crime is a challenge because it requires variation in school schedules.
Existing studies rely on sporadically occurring disruptions to schedules which reduce
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the number of days that students are in school in a given week, e.g. teacher inservice
days (Jacob and Lefgren, 2003), and randomly occurring events such as strikes (Lu-
allen, 2006), or furloughs (Akee et al., 2014). All of these studies focus on a temporary
response to an unexpected school schedule change.1
We offer an alternative approach, one that exploits the adoption of the four-day
school week policy across rural counties and years within the state of Colorado, one
of the states where the four-day week is most common. The main contribution of this
study is to identify changes to youth criminal behavior associated with a more inten-
tional and prolonged schedule change. On one hand, parents, schools, and communities
can more effectively prepare for this more permanent schedule change. On the other
hand, the effects associated with this type of policy may be larger than those found
in previous work because this type of schedule change is regular and long-lasting. As
such, gaining a better understanding of the impact of more permanent schedule changes
on criminal behavior has important policy implications since many school districts
throughout the U.S. have started to experiment with alternative schedules (i.e.year-
round school or the four-day weeks, etc.) in an attempt to cut costs and/or boost student
performance.
Using data on reported crimes by day-of-the-week and aggregating to the county-
year level, we show that on average property crimes in rural Colorado counties increase
as a result of the policy. In particular, larceny crimes increase substantially when four-
day school weeks are adopted. Alternatively, we find no statistically significant evi-
dence that juvenile drug or violent crime rates change. Our results are consistent with a
1While inservice days (Jacob and Lefgren, 2003) are planned ahead of time by school officials, they
appear sporadically throughout the year and often vary widely from location to locations.
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2011 report from the U.S. Department of Justice that shows larceny is the most common
juvenile crime.2
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2.2 we provide a conceptual framework
as well as review the current literature on the effects of school attendance on crime
and the four-day school week policy. section 2.3 and section 2.4 describe the data
and empirical framework respectively. The baseline results are presented in section 2.5
and section 2.6 shows evidence that the findings persist across a variety of robustness
checks. section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Juvenile Crime and Four-Day School Week Policies
2.2.1 How might the four-day school week impact youth crime?
It is unclear whether the four-day week schedule promotes or hinders youth crimi-
nal activity. Different types of crime may be affected very differently. There are several
channels through which students’ school attendance may affect youth criminal behav-
ior. Incapacitation refers to the notion that juveniles who are kept busy and who are
under adult supervision will remain out of trouble during these hours. Stated somewhat
differently, students who have less idle time are less likely to engage in illegal activ-
ities. School, after-school programs, and other youth programs are forms of juvenile
incapacitation. The incapacitation component of school is therefore expected to reduce
juvenile property and violent crime rates during hours in which school is in session. It
2Property crime is defined as the unlawfully taking of property from the possession of another without
the use of force, threat or fraud and comprises several types of theft including larceny, burglary, arson
and motor vehicle theft. Larceny is the most common type of property crime committed by juveniles and
includes shoplifting, pick-pocketing, bicycle theft, theft from a vehicle including vehicle parts, or theft
from a building or structure where no break in was involved.
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is also possible that incapacitation has positive indirect effects. For example, students
may be exposed to a new activity or made aware of healthy choices while incapacitated
and choose to spend time on this outside of school hours rather than getting into trouble.
An alternative channel – one that receives less attention in policy circles and the
popular press – is that school or other youth programs increase the concentration of
youth which may increase crime. First, the concentration of students at school provides
increased interactions and a space for conflict to arise in the form of fights or other
violent exchanges. Although this mechanism suggests that violent crimes could be
elevated during school hours, these crimes may also increase outside of school as a
result of concentration if the involved parties plan to settle their differences at a later
time. Second, school may provide a low cost way to coordinate crimes such as drug
transactions or to plan property crimes that may be executed outside of school. A
concentration story predicts that school attendance increases all types of crime during
or after hours.
In the context of this paper, an incapacitation story suggests that juvenile crime
will likely increase in counties that have adopted a four-day school week schedule.
The direct effect of incapacitation suggests that that crime will increase on the days
of the week that students are not attending school (Monday or Friday) due to lack of
adult supervision. Not only are students not at school, but many parents are likely at
work and therefore many teenaged students are likely unsupervised. An indirect effect
associated with incapacitation will lead to an increase in crime during non-school hours.
A concentration story, on the other hand, implies that crime will decline in treated areas
specifically on the weekday that students are off from school, but potentially also during
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non-school hours, because there are fewer opportunities to interact and coordinate with
other students.
2.2.2 Related Literature
There is a substantial body of empirical research examining incapacitation. The
general finding is that incapacitation decreases criminal activity and other risky be-
havior such as teen pregnancy. However, the primary focus of this literature has been
on variation in the number of years spent in school based on compulsory schooling
laws (Anderson, 2012; Anderson et al., 2013; Berthelon and Kruger, 2011; Black et al.,
2008; Lochner and Moretti, 2004). This means that the effects are often temporally
distinct from the actual program occupying the individuals, so these studies provide
little insight into the effect of a program to keep students out of trouble in the immedi-
ate future. Additionally, these policies don’t allow for the estimation of concentration
effects.3
Research that addresses the distinction between incapacitation and concentration
effects typically relies on exogenous variation in the amount of time that a student
spends in school. Jacob and Lefgren (2003) rely on teacher in-service days to estimate
a causal relationship between school attendance and crime in urban settings. They find
that juvenile property crime declines by 14% on days when school is in session but vi-
olent crime for this same group increases by 28% percent on school days. A reduction
in property crime associated with increased school attendance is consistent with inca-
3A related body of literature relies on experimental interventions in after-school programs to deter-
mine the impact of school attendance on youth criminal activity. Insight from these studies is limited
due to selective participation; programs of this nature are typically not mandatory and those most at risk
may avoid them (see Cross et al. (2009); Rodríguez-Planas (2012)).
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pacitation since the reduction was detected on days (and hours) when students were in
school. The spike in violent crime on these days provides evidence for a concentration
story.
Luallen (2006) exploits school attendance variation caused by teacher strikes –
which resulted in canceled school days – to estimate an incapacitation effect. He finds
that juvenile property crime and violent crime increase on days with strikes, but that the
results are solely driven by urban areas. Akee et al. (2014) estimate the school-crime
relationship based on public school teacher furlough days in Hawaii and find that time
off from school is associated with significantly fewer juvenile crimes which supports a
concentration story. In contrast to these studies, four-day school weeks are primarily
located in rural areas and adopted over a long time frame.
2.2.3 Four-Day School Week Policies
As of 2008, seventeen states had switched a portion of their school schedules from a
five-day week to a four-day week.4 The primary motivation for states to implement this
policy is to reduce transportation costs, which are especially salient for rural schools.
The four-day school week became particularly popular during the energy crisis in the
1970s, at which time many states began changing laws regarding days spent in school.
During this period the Colorado legislature changed their law from a mandatory number
of school days to a mandatory number of hours, enabling districts in the state to adopt
a four-day school week. The number of hours a student spends at school per year
4Starting with South Dakota in the 1930s, the following states have schools on the four-day week:
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin and Wyoming. However, many of
these programs are very limited. See http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/school-calendar-four-day-
school-week-overview.aspx for background on specific state legislation regarding four-day schools.
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remains constant and is typically set by state statute. To compensate for one fewer day
of instruction, those on the four-day week schedule attend school for more hours per
day and/or more days in the year. Over the following decades there was a slow shift
towards the four-day week schedule in rural districts. As of 2009, 20% of students in
Colorado attend four-day week schools. Of the schools that have switched in Colorado,
roughly 80% are on a Monday through Thursday schedule with Fridays off with the
remainder on a Tuesday-Friday schedule with Mondays off.
Given that cost considerations are central to the decision to switch, research on four-
day school weeks has primarily focused on financial savings. Grau and Shaughnessy
(1987), using data from ten school districts in New Mexico, document that districts
operating on a four-day week experience a 10%-25% savings on fuel, electricity and
transportation costs. Griffith (2011) examines six school districts that are either on the
four-day week or in transition to that schedule and finds that the policy yields a max-
imum of about 5.5% savings.5 Despite their growing prevalence, little work has been
done to understand the impact of four-day school weeks on students. To the best of our
knowledge, the only study at this point which evaluates the impact of four-day school
weeks is Anderson and Walker (2014). Their analysis focuses on the state of Colorado
and they find a modest, but statistically significant, positive relationship between the
policy and elementary school students’ math and reading test scores. Their findings
suggest that switching to a four-day week does not compromise student achievement,
and may even improve it.
5Four day school weeks have been of interest in popular media as well and journalists have gone to
some effort to examine specific cases of the policy change. A TIME Magazine article (Kingsbury, 2008)
reports that some rural school districts experienced large savings on transportation, utility, and insurance
costs as a result of the policy and a Wall Street Journal article (Herring, 2010) sheds light on the savings
that the policy has brought to a rural district in Georgia.
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2.3 Data
We combine several data sources for our analysis which includes 47 rural counties
in Colorado for the years 1993-2009. Because four day schools are primarily under-
taken in rural areas and there exists almost no variation in school schedules across
urban areas, we restrict our analysis to rural counties only.6 For our purposes, a county
is defined as rural if it is not part of a metropolitan statistical area (MSA).7 Data indi-
cating which schools are on a four-day school week and the timing of when they switch
from a five-day schedule to a four-day schedule come from the Colorado Department
of Education.8 We link these schools with counties since crime data is aggregated to
the county level.9 Nearly one-third of all rural counties have at least one school that is
on a four-day school week and approximately 20% of students attend a school on this
schedule.
We use the Common Core of Data (CCD) from the National Center for Educa-
tion Statistics, which contains the universe of Colorado schools, to obtain total student
population by county and several measures of student body composition including the
percent white, the percent on free or reduced lunch and the student/teacher ratio. The
CCD and the list of four-day schools are combined to obtain the treatment variable:
6Less than 5% of the total student body in urban areas are affected by the policy compared to 20% in
rural areas. Including urban counties in the analysis will introduce noise, which is generated by smaller
changes in student population, into the treatment variable. We want our estimates to reflect changes due
to policy adoption. Table 7 reports the baseline results for all of Colorado. While there are some minor
differences, the results are largely the same.
7The MSAs omitted are Denver, Boulder, Greeley, Colorado Springs, Fort Collins, Pueblo, and Grand
Junction. Other possible definitions of rural, such as population counts or only omitting the Denver MSA,
have been considered and have little influence on the estimated results.
8We thank Mark Anderson of Montana State University for helping us obtain this data.
9While there is crime data available at more granular jurisdictional level than counties, these jurisdic-
tions do not overlap in any consistent way with school boundaries.
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the percentage of students in grades 6 through 12 on a four-day school week.10 We
use these grades because juveniles age 11-17 account for over 99% of juvenile crimes
reported in Colorado.
We use two crime datasets. The first is county level arrests from the Colorado
Department of Public Safety. This dataset contains reported arrests by crime type and
by county in each year for the entire sample, 1993 through 2009. Summary statistics
are reported in Table 2.1 (column 1). This dataset has the advantage of covering all
arrests in Colorado. However, since it is aggregated annually the timing does not match
up perfectly with the treatment variable which is reported by academic years. The
second data source is the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) program.
NIBRS provides detailed information on reported crimes at the incident level, including
the date of the crime. This allows us to match the reported crimes with the treatment
variable by academic year and avoid a timing problem. Reported crimes are a superset
of arrests because they include people who are cited for a crime without actually being
arrested, which is a common occurrence. The number of offenses is aggregated up to
the county level to match the level of treatment and the other dataset.
In addition to providing detailed data on individual crimes, an advantage of the NI-
BRS data is that it flags the exact date of the offense as well as detailed demographic
characteristics of the offenders; this allows us to precisely identify juveniles in the
sample as well as examine changes in crime by day-of-the-week. Unfortunately, Col-
orado has only been fully participating in the NIBRS program since 1997, so the data
are not available for the entire sample period. As such, all regressions using NIBRS
data include the years 1997 through 2009. Additionally, while the data covers most of
10The results are similar if we use all students on a four-day school week regardless of age and per-
centage of schools on a 4 day week.
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Colorado, there are some agencies (approximately 10% of agencies covering approxi-
mately 10% of the state’s population) who do not participate in the program, reducing
the number of rural counties in the NIBRS sample to 44.11 Column 2 of Table 2.1
contains summary statistics for offenses from NIBRS. The outcomes are normalized
by population and defined as crime (offenses or arrests) per 1,000 population in the
county.12
The crime outcomes studied in this analysis include property crimes, violent crime
and drug violations. Property crime is a general category consisting of larceny, break-
ing and entering, grand theft auto, and arson. Also included are violent crimes which
consist of homicide, sexual assault, robbery, and assault. Drug crimes are a separate
category. Some incidents reported in the NIBRS dataset involve more than one offense
(i.e. breaking and entering while in possession of illegal drugs). In these cases we count
the incident in both categories. While this results in some double counting of incidents,
the alternatives are less palatable. Dropping all of these incidents results in a substan-
tial loss of data. Some systems use a hierarchy such that an incident is categorized as
its most “severe” offense type; however, these distinctions are often arbitrary and can
result in under-counting of some kinds of crimes, especially drug offenses.
11While we are able to adjust the sample by dropping agencies that do not fully participate in NIBRS,
any remaining underreporting should cause the coefficient to be biased downwards, as the number of
reported crimes would be lower than actual number of crimes in the county.
12Due to the 10% of non-participating agencies in the NIBRS dataset we are not able to normalize
the offense data by youth population, instead we normalize by the population provided by NIBRS which
adjusts for the non-compliers. In order to make estimates comparable across datasets, we also normalize
the arrest data by total population in a count-year. Note, we have also normalized arrest data by youth
population and obtain similar results.
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2.4 Empirical Framework
We estimate the following difference-in-difference model
Yct = β0 +β1Tct +X ′ctα+ γc +δt + εct (2.1)
where variable Yct is the number of crimes (arrests or offenses depending on the
dataset) in county c and in year t.13 Tct is the percent of students in a county in a given
year that are on a four-day school week schedule, Xct is a vector of county-year level
covariates (unemployment, percent of students in county eligible for free lunch, race,
and student/teacher ratio), γc is a county level fixed effect, δt is a year fixed effect, and
εct is the usual error term. The treatment variable Tct is constructed by dividing the
total number of students in grades 6-12 in a county who are on the four-day week in
a given year by the total number of students in grades 6-12 in a county-year. When
using the Colorado DPS arrests data we drop the year that a school first adopts this
policy since the crime data is reported by calendar year (as opposed to academic year)
and the initial year is only partially treated. We exclude summer months because no
students are treated during this time, and all regressions are weighted by the average
county population.
We estimate the above model using two methods, OLS (Ordinary Least Squares)
where the data generating process is assumed to be linear, and Fixed Effect Poisson
QMLE (Quasi Maximum Likelihood Estimation); a non-linear specification. Although
we report estimates from both models, due to the non-linear nature of the data, the
13The outcome is a count in the Poisson models and a rate (crimes per 1,000 residents) in the OLS
specifications.
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preferred estimates come from the FE Poisson.14 Additionally, the FE Poisson corrects
for overdispersion and excess zeros; which are both present in the data. In particular,
clustered standard errors at the county level correct for the issue of overdispersion, and
the fixed effects deal with the excess zeros (Wooldridge (1999)).
Anecdotally, there is little reason to believe that the adoption of the policy is in re-
sponse to crime patterns in a given county or correlated with unobservable time varying
county characteristics that also correlate with juvenile crime; two issues which would
undermine the causal interpretation of the policy’s effect. In Colorado, the schools that
have adopted a four-day school week most often cite financial savings as the reason
(Anderson and Walker, 2014; Donis-Keller and Silvernail, 2009; Grau and Shaugh-
nessy, 1987). The Colorado Department of Education states that four-day schedules
are almost entirely adopted by schools in rural districts that serve a dispersed group of
students because they can save on transportation costs. Other reasons schools have de-
cided to switch include parent support, improved attendance, and increased academic
performance. We return to this issue in Section 6 and show that selection into the policy
is not a major concern.
2.5 Results
Table 2 reports regression coefficient estimates obtained from the arrest data in the
odd numbered columns and results obtained from the reported offense data (NIBRS)
in the even numbered columns. Four crime outcomes (for both arrests and offenses)
are included in each table: larceny, property crime, drug violations and violent crime.
14Due to the large number of zeros in the crime data (our outcome), we can’t simply take a log
transformation and run OLS; an approach often used when dealing with a non-linear outcome.
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Because it is the convention in this literature to use a count model, Table 2a reports
the point estimates for Equation 2.1 from a FE Poisson specification. The results in
columns 1 and 2 show a significant increase in juvenile larceny arrests and offenses.
Switching all students in a county to a four-day week leads to larceny crimes nearly
doubling. Companion Table 2b reports OLS results, which are consistent with the
Poisson results, and shows that switching all students in a county to a four-day school
week leads to a 1.3 increase in juvenile arrests for larceny per 1,000 population or a 1.7
increase in reported juvenile offenses for larceny per 1,000 population. This effect is
large, it is about a 50% increase from the mean or a little more than 1 standard deviation
for larceny arrests and approximately 87% of a standard deviation for reported larceny
offenses, although effects of this magnitude are not unusual in the literature.15
Columns 3 and 4 (of Table 2) report the estimated effect of the policy on all property
crime. Since larceny is part of property crime, it is not surprising that the effects are
similar to the larceny estimates but slightly smaller in magnitude. It is not implausible
that students who have an additional day off during the week are more likely to engage
in minor offenses such as shoplifting and other petty theft, while property crimes such
as arson and breaking and entering are not affected. The aggregation of all of these
crimes may account for the fact that property crime show a somewhat smaller positive
coefficient. For both arrests and offenses the estimated effects of the percent of students
on a four-day school week on drug violations and violent crime (columns 5-8) are
statistically and economically insignificant.
15For example, Jacob and Lefgren (2003) find effects on property crimes that roughly range between
50% and 75% of a standard deviation.
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2.5.1 Day-of-the-Week Results
Aggregating the NIBRS data to day-of-the-week, county, year level allows us to
examine the effects of the four-day school week policy on specific days. Table 3 re-
ports the corresponding summary statistics for this level of aggregation. Examining
crime patterns at this level may help to disentangle the mechanism which underlies our
main findings. Is crime increasing on the specific day that students on a four-day week
have off? A crime spike on Fridays due to an increase in the number of students who
are treated on Friday would be consistent with the direct effects of an incapacitation
story. Alternatively, finding lower levels of crime on the day students have off would
be consistent with concentration.
To investigate this, we run the following specification:
Yctd = β0+β1T Fct +β2T Mct +
7
∑
d=1
θdT Fct ∗ψd +
7
∑
d=1
µdT Mct ∗ψd +X ′ctα+γc+δt +ψd +εctd
(2.2)
where ψd is a set of dummy variables indicating the day of the week (Wednesday is
the omitted day). T Fct and T Mct are the percent of students in a county-year treated
on Friday and Monday respectively. Both treatment variables are also interacted with
each day of the week which are represented by the following vectors, ∑7d=1θdT Fct ∗ψd
and ∑7d=1 µdT Mct ∗ψd . Other controls included are defined in the previous section and
the results of the estimation are included in Table 4a (Table 4b reports the OLS results).
The results show that although overall the policy increases larceny and property crimes,
there is no evidence that it differentially increases on a particular day. That is, the policy
does not cause crime to increase on Fridays (the day students have off) any more than
any other day of the week. One possibility for this somewhat unintuitive result is that
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because we are analyzing rural counties, there may be too few observations in a given
county/year/day cell to detect any differences across days. Another explanation is that
students who have an "extra" day off per week not only increase their unlawful behavior
on their day off (typically Friday), but this also spills-over to other days of the week.
Either way, we find no evidence of a direct incapacitation story, although spill-overs
from incapacitation may be an underlying mechanism. Clearly, a concentration story
has been ruled out. If the concentration component of school attendance had dominated,
then crime would have decreased on Fridays and/or overall, and we find the opposite – it
increases. Similar to the county-year results in Table 2, we find no consistent changes
in drug or violent crimes due to the policy, either overall or on any given day of the
week. The varied findings across the different crime outcomes, however, highlights
the importance of disaggregating crime by type for the analysis. Uncovering how the
policy affects each type of crime, if at all, and through which channel helps provide a
more comprehensive understanding of the impact of the four-day school week.
2.6 Robustness Checks
The results reported so far are robust to a variety of alternative specifications, in-
cluding changing the treatment definition to percent of schools instead of students and
varying the definition of rural.16 Three additional robustness checks – a placebo test
using adult crime, a county-year placebo test, and a check for the exogeneity of policy
adoption, are examined in this section.
16We also restrict the sample to only summer months and find no effect.
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2.6.1 Adult Crime and County Placebo Test
To ensure that the treatment variable is not picking up some underlying change, such
as changes in the local economy or law enforcement practices, we run identical models
using adult (age 25+) crime as the outcome.17 If juvenile crime is only increasing in
areas because of the treatment (the four-day week policy), then the relationship between
the percent of juveniles on a four-day week in a given county-year and adult crimes
should not be statistically significant. Table 5, which is formatted the same as Table
2, contains the results for adult arrests and adult offenses. Neither dataset (arrests or
offenses) indicates a significant effect for adult crime, supporting the idea that a four-
day school week policy is uniquely impacting juveniles and is not a proxy for other
unobserved changes in the county.
Moreover, since we use many juvenile and adult crime outcomes in this analysis,
there is the potential for a multiple testing problem. That is, increasing the number
of outcomes used in the analysis increases the likelihood that some of the treatment
coefficients will appear statistically significant even if a true relationship does not exist.
To check for this concern, we test the joint significance of the estimated effect of the
treatment obtained from the four juvenile crime outcomes: larceny, property, drug and
violent. If our findings are an artifact of the multiple testing problem then we should
reject that the four coefficients are jointly equal to zero. We find evidence against the
null at the 2% level. On the other hand, we fail to reject that the estimated effect of
the four-day week using the four adult crime outcomes are jointly statistically different
from zero. Together these results alleviate the concern of a multiple testing problem.
17Individuals ages 18-25 are left out of these models. Some 18 year-olds are still in high school (and
are therefore in the treated population) and those just out of high school are likely to socialize with treated
individuals and may be indirectly affected by treatment.
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As an additional sensitivity test we conduct a county level placebo analysis. Coun-
ties are randomly reassigned the percent on a four-day week (the treatment variable)
of a different county. This reassignment maintains the characteristics of the treatment
profile, the treatment turns on and can increase over time, but the timing of treatment
has been randomly reassigned. If our main results are really capturing the effect of the
policy on crime, the results for this specification should reveal no relationship between
the treatment and crime outcome since the reassigned treatment does not reflect the true
percent in that county-year who are treated. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the es-
timated coefficients of the treatment variable from estimating Equation 1 1,000 times,
each time with random reassignment of the treatment profile. The actual estimate is
indicated with a red dashed line. The median estimate of the effect and the associated
statistics are both essentially 0, which strongly suggests our observed effect is not an
artifact of the estimation strategy.
2.6.2 Leads of the Treatment Variables
A concern with our empirical approach which would threaten the identification of
our estimates is if school districts are adopting this policy in response to the current
crime rate in the county. For instance, if schools in counties with high crime rates adopt
the four-day week policy as a means to reduce crime (and potentially are adopting other
crime reducing policies concurrently), then the internal validity of our results will be
jeopardized. We check for this type of adoption behavior by including leads of the
treatment variable to Equation 2.1. We follow a similar approach to that of Gruber and
Hanratty (1995), Friedberg (1998), and Bedard and Do (2005) and run the following
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model:
Yct = β0 +β1Tct +β2xct +λ14Tct+1 +λ24Tct+2 +X ′ctα+ γc +δt + εct (2.3)
Note that the two lead terms 4Tct+1 and 4Tct+2 are the percent of students in a
four-day school in a county between year t=0 and t=1 and then between t=1 and t=2,
respectively. Thus, the estimated coefficients on these two lead terms represent the
relationship between the change in four-day school week adoption between years t/t+1
and t+1/t+2 and crime in that county. If high crime rates in a county lead to the adoption
of a four-day school week, we should observe school districts responding to high crime
rates by adopting the four-day week in the following year and thus the estimates on the
lead terms λ1and λ2 should be positive and significant. Table 6 contains the results for
the estimates on the lead terms and shows that they are statistically insignificant and,
even though they are occasionally large, vary widely in sign indicating that schools
likely are not adopting this policy as a response to crime rates.18 Since this specification
relies on changes in policy adoption between years thus reducing the sample size, to
provide context Table 6 also contains the baseline results for this restricted sample.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper we show that the implementation of the four-day school week in rural
areas leads to an increase in youth property crime, particularly larceny, while drug and
violent crimes appear unaffected. Although our findings are not directly inline with the
18This test is not feasible in the arrests data because we drop the year of adoption due to it being
partially treated.
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standard incapacitation story often cited in the literature which shows spikes in crime
at exactly the times when students are off from school, the estimates in this paper are
consistent with spill-overs associated with incapacitation. That is, property crimes not
only increases on days that they have off (Friday), but also on other days. Overall, these
results are informative in that they highlight the fact that policymakers should consider
the unintended consequences before implementing such a schedule.
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Figure 2.1: County Placebo Test
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Arrest Data NIBRS Data: Offenses 
Percent on 4-Day Week 0.23 0.21
(0.37) (0.35)
Percent Not Treated 0.48 0.48
(0.50) (0.50)
Percent Treated: 0.01 -49 % 0.31 0.34
(0.46) (0.47)
Percent Treated: 50 - 99% 0.05 0.04
(0.23) (0.19)
Percent Fully Treated 0.15 0.13
(0.36) (0.34)
Percent with Friday Off 0.21 0.18
(0.36) (0.33)
Percent with Monday Off 0.03 0.03
(0.11) (0.13)
Juv. Larceny Crime per 1,000 0.87 1.02
(1.13) (1.99)
Juv. Drug Crime per 1,000 0.30 0.59
(0.41) (1.05)
Juv. Property Crime per 1,000 1.17 2.13
(1.35) (3.24)
Juv. Violent Crime per 1,000 0.14 0.70
(0.26) (1.13)
Juv. Larceny Crime 17.53 17.992
(27.80) (26.527)
Juv. Drug Crime 5.58 6.867
(8.85) (9.730)
Juv. Property Crime 21.96 22.648
(32.60) (31.083)
Juv. Violent Crime 2.03 2.223
(3.77) (3.967)
Adult Larceny Crime per 1,000 1.85 8.42
(1.72) (12.04)
Adult Drug Crime per 1,000 1.81 1.34
(1.83) (1.48)
Adult Property Crime per 1,000 2.51 16.04
(2.07) (19.18)
Adult Violent Crime per 1,000 1.10 3.32
(0.93) (2.99)
Adult Larceny Crime 33.37 36.204
(45.89) (46.160)
Adult Drug Crime 30.26 36.358
(42.85) (46.310)
Adult Property Crime 42.76 46.290
(55.60) (55.870)
Adult Violent Crime 14.93 16.709
(17.70) (18.583)
Population 13,416 14,928
12,544 13,500
Unemployment Rate 4.84 4.70
(2.24) (1.93)
Percent Free Lunch 0.28 0.29
(0.15) (0.15)
Percent White 0.75 0.74
(0.18) (0.18)
Student/Teacher Ratio 13.60 13.64
(2.63) (2.56)
Observations 721 526
Note: These are summary statistics including all years. The arrest data is from 
1993-2009 and the NIBRS (offense) data is from 1996-2009. In general  the 
offense data is a superset of the arrest data. However, the adult offense data is 
defined as ages 25+ and the adult arrest data includes those 18 and older.  
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: Rural Counties in Colorado
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Arrests NIBRS Arrests NIBRS Arrests NIBRS Arrests NIBRS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Percent on 4-Day Week 0.963* 0.824*** 0.846** 0.699*** -0.351 -0.741 0.702 0.309
(0.519) (0.311) (0.332) (0.228) (0.611) (0.491) (0.758) (0.867)
Umemployment Rate -0.0706* -0.0806** -0.044 -0.051 0.009 -0.012 0.018 0.028
(0.038) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.049) (0.049) (0.064) (0.063)
Percent on Free Lunch -0.810 0.158 -0.929 0.052 -2.170* -2.242** 4.355** 4.803**
(0.923) (1.115) (0.740) (0.826) (1.124) (1.133) (2.076) (2.222)
Percent White -1.442** -1.491*** -1.596** -1.805*** -0.619 -0.571 -0.561 -0.513
(0.695) (0.498) (0.763) (0.465) (1.202) (0.916) (2.622) (2.081)
Student/Teacher Ratio 0.0703* 0.0973** 0.038 0.054 -0.030 -0.074 0.060 0.001
(0.037) (0.049) (0.034) (0.042) (0.056) (0.054) (0.071) (0.085)
County Controls X X X X X X X X
County & Year FEs X X X X X X X X
Observations 679 476 721 515 637 478 700 511
Notes: The estimation sample is restircted to only rural areas (those counties outside of an MSA). The outcome is a 
count of crimes per county-year. Even columns report results using the arrest data from the Colorado DPS , odd columns 
report results using the NIBRS data. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the county level in 
parentheses. All regressions are weighted by county population.
 Larceny  Property  Drug Violent
Table 2.2: Poisson Model Base Specification – The Effect of Four-Day Week on Juvenile Crime
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Arrests NIBRS Arrests NIBRS Arrests NIBRS Arrests NIBRS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Percent on 4-Day Week 1.329*** 1.735** 1.507*** 2.157 -0.040 0.376 0.050 0.206
(0.465) (0.847) (0.511) (1.300) (0.108) (0.529) (0.091) (0.584)
Umemployment Rate -0.032 0.12 -0.014 0.142 0.002 0.0147 0.002 0.0527
(0.078) (0.120) (0.082) (0.216) (0.020) (0.053) (0.015) (0.061)
Percent on Free Lunch -4.822*** 2.771 -5.258*** 6.318 -0.653 0.425 0.749 3.748*
(1.564) (4.769) (1.851) (6.584) (0.422) (1.923) (0.464) (2.217)
Percent White -2.914* 3.778 -3.975 3.569 -0.265 0.361 -0.131 -0.389
(1.542) (3.580) (1.809) (5.524) (0.598) (1.377) (0.430) (1.617)
Student/Teacher Ratio -2.368 -12.1 0.407 -2.399 0.248 8.843 -2.007 14.41
(10.232) (23.310) (11.968) (38.410) (3.048) (8.864) (1.842) (12.870)
County Controls X X X X X X X X
County & Year FEs X X X X X X X X
Observations 721 526 721 526 721 526 721 526
Notes: The estimation sample is restircted to only rural areas (those counties outside of an MSA). The outcome is 
measured as offenses per 1,000 population and is observed by academic year. Even columns report results using the 
arrest data from the Colorado DPS , odd columns report results using the NIBRS data. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Standard errors are clustered at the county level in parentheses. All regressions are weighted by county population.
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Table 2.3: OLS Base Specification – The Effect of Four-Day Week on Juvenile Crime
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No Treat Off Fri Off Mon No Treat Off Fri Off Mon No Treat Off Fri Off Mon No Treat Off Fri Off Mon
Overall Crime 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.40 0.29 0.32 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.10
(0.519) (0.299) (0.333) (0.898) (0.551) (0.542) (0.372) (0.247) (0.128) (0.320) (0.220) (0.203)
Monday 0.22 0.12 0.11 0.45 0.24 0.26 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.11
(0.689) (0.219) (0.242) (0.998) (0.414) (0.457) (0.221) (0.158) (0.109) (0.311) (0.143) (0.178)
Tuesday 0.21 0.16 0.15 0.37 0.30 0.36 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.15 0.14 0.095
(0.819) (0.341) (0.354) (0.941) (0.545) (0.651) (0.475) (0.164) (0.117) (0.347) (0.263) (0.179)
Wednesday 0.20 0.14 0.16 0.40 0.27 0.29 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.10
(0.431) (0.278) (0.394) (0.793) (0.442) (0.529) (0.361) (0.343) (0.164) (0.278) (0.252) (0.153)
Thursday 0.18 0.11 0.14 0.33 0.27 0.29 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.10
(0.409) (0.194) (0.291) (0.568) (0.449) (0.495) (0.312) (0.177) (0.143) (0.407) (0.235) (0.214)
Friday 0.22 0.18 0.19 0.52 0.34 0.46 0.17 0.07 0.05 0.18 0.13 0.09
(0.420) (0.355) (0.440) (1.398) (0.711) (0.639) (0.563) (0.126) (0.093) (0.412) (0.265) (0.162)
Saturday 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.39 0.33 0.29 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.09
(0.340) (0.405) (0.299) (0.672) (0.671) (0.483) (0.293) (0.387) (0.168) (0.222) (0.187) (0.216)
Sunday 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.32 0.27 0.26 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.10
(0.320) (0.229) (0.277) (0.618) (0.552) (0.496) (0.243) (0.241) (0.052) (0.185) (0.160) (0.292)
Observations 1,688 1,240 586 1,688 1,240 586 1,688 1,240 586 1,688 1,240 586
Notes: The estimation sample is restircted to only rural areas (those counties outside of an MSA). The outcome is measured as offenses per 
1,000 population and is observed by academic year. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the county level in 
parentheses. All regressions are weighted by county population.
Violent Larceny Property Drug
Table 2.4: Summary Stats by Day-of-the-Week (NIBRS Offense Data)
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Larceny Property Drug  Violent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percent Treated Friday 0.948*** 0.895*** -0.698 0.610
(0.289) (0.212) (0.538) (0.822)
Percent Treated Monday 0.180 -0.516 -1.344 -0.132
(1.791) (0.784) (1.289) (1.644)
Percent Treated Fri X Fri -0.0508** -0.039 0.034 -0.139
(0.025) (0.040) (0.027) (0.157)
Percent Treated Fri X Sat -0.039 -0.008 0.0714*** -0.016
(0.059) (0.053) (0.025) (0.056)
Percent Treated Fri X Sun -0.016 0.000 0.021 -0.079
(0.014) (0.014) (0.026) (0.072)
Percent Treated Fri X Mon -0.044 -0.056 0.0483* -0.111
(0.054) (0.050) (0.027) (0.113)
Percent Treated Fri X Tues -0.050 -0.009 0.0633*** -0.001
(0.058) (0.053) (0.019) (0.052)
Percent Treated Fri X Thurs -0.021 0.023 0.0704* -0.034
(0.059) (0.055) (0.037) (0.084)
Percent Treated Mon X Fri -0.045 0.021 0.107 0.024
(0.121) (0.099) (0.113) (0.156)
Percent Treated Mon X Sat -0.112 -0.146 -0.117* -0.201
(0.138) (0.105) (0.063) (0.141)
Percent Treated Mon X Sun 0.062 0.052 0.102 -0.102
(0.191) (0.144) (0.091) (0.201)
Percent Treated Mon X Mon -0.028 -0.052 -0.065 0.039
(0.143) (0.108) (0.050) (0.111)
Percent Treated Mon X Tues 0.083 0.133 0.090 -0.190
(0.157) (0.095) (0.116) (0.252)
Percent Treated Mon X Thurs 0.124 0.131 -0.020 -0.102
(0.153) (0.107) (0.056) (0.194)
Monday 0.005 0.00389* -0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
Tuesday 0.004 0.001 -0.004 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Tursday -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.011
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.014)
Friday 0.011 0.006 -0.006 0.004
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011)
Saturday 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Sunday 0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Time Varying County Charact. X X X X
County & Year Fixed Effects X X X X
Observations 3,216 3,414 3,222 3,369
Notes: The estimation sample is restricted to only rural areas (those counties outside of an 
MSA). The outcome is measured as offenses per 1,000 population and is observed by academic 
year. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the county level in 
parentheses. All regressions are weighted by county population.
Table 2.5: Poisson Model Day-of-the-Week Analysis (NIBRS Data)
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Larceny Property Drug  Violent
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percent Treated Friday 0.254* 0.317 0.104 0.018
(0.148) (0.189) (0.085) (0.101)
Percent Treated Monday 0.764* 0.990 0.098 0.454*
(0.409) (0.622) (0.244) (0.242)
Percent Treated Fri X Fri 0.046 -0.032 -0.145** -0.080
(0.054) (0.111) (0.062) (0.054)
Percent Treated Fri X Sat 0.052 0.047 -0.020 0.054
(0.049) (0.101) (0.070) (0.034)
Percent Treated Fri X Sun 0.132** 0.185* 0.060 0.050
(0.057) (0.094) (0.053) (0.035)
Percent Treated Fri X Mon 0.006 -0.083 -0.007 -0.015
(0.053) (0.113) (0.051) (0.061)
Percent Treated Fri X Tues -0.002 0.009 -0.081 -0.005
(0.045) (0.083) (0.086) (0.043)
Percent Treated Fri X Thurs 0.042 0.084 -0.059 0.006
(0.043) (0.093) (0.065) (0.075)
Percent Treated Mon X Fri 0.059 0.663** -0.389** -0.465**
(0.192) (0.314) (0.186) (0.213)
Percent Treated Mon X Sat -0.255 -0.208 -0.299 -0.085
(0.251) (0.263) (0.289) (0.173)
Percent Treated Mon X Sun 0.189 0.199 -0.070 -0.022
(0.242) (0.361) (0.237) (0.210)
Percent Treated Mon X Mon -0.309 -0.384 -0.028 -0.213
(0.208) (0.384) (0.153) (0.209)
Percent Treated Mon X Tues -0.206 0.778 -0.251 -0.380*
(0.252) (0.614) (0.203) (0.192)
Percent Treated Mon X Thurs 0.169 0.327 -0.169 -0.085
(0.276) (0.260) (0.251) (0.263)
Monday -0.004 0.047 -0.039** 0.018
(0.024) (0.047) (0.018) (0.032)
Tuesday 0.025 0.019 0.024 0.053**
(0.028) (0.040) (0.035) (0.025)
Tursday -0.049** -0.044 0.014 0.031
(0.019) (0.037) (0.015) (0.042)
Friday -0.008 0.045 0.043** 0.07**
(0.023) (0.044) (0.019) (0.032)
Saturday -0.012 0.029 0.000 -0.030
(0.027) (0.036) (0.039) (0.019)
Sunday -0.108*** -0.098** -0.075** -0.039**
(0.029) (0.043) (0.034) (0.016)
Time Varying County Charact. X X X X
County & Year Fixed Effects X X X X
Observations 3,368 3,368 3,368 3,368
Notes: The estimation sample is restricted to only rural areas (those counties outside of an MSA). The outcome is 
measured as offenses per 1,000 population and is observed by academic year. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard 
errors are clustered at the county level in parentheses. All regressions are weighted by county population.
Table 2.6: OLS Day-of-the-Week Analysis (NIBRS Data)
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Arrests NIBRS Arrests NIBRS Arrests NIBRS Arrests NIBRS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Percent on 4-Day Week 0.066 0.160 0.028 0.128 -0.352 -0.121 -0.043 0.357
(0.201) (0.389) (0.226) (0.382) (0.525) (0.446) (0.455) (0.358)
Umemployment Rate -0.025 -0.101** -0.036 -0.102** -0.019 -0.108** -0.038 -0.027
(0.036) (0.045) (0.037) (0.041) (0.046) (0.049) (0.053) (0.052)
Percent on Free Lunch -0.881 -2.572 -0.936 -2.564* -0.579 -1.380 0.360 -2.157**
(1.124) (1.568) (1.113) (1.473) (1.132) (1.334) (1.083) (0.994)
Percent White 1.255 0.908 0.731 0.565 1.401 1.232 -0.376 -1.433
(0.783) (1.601) (0.808) (1.592) (1.041) (1.145) (1.534) (1.625)
Student/Teacher Ratio 0.002 -0.068 0.002 -0.0828* 0.016 -0.049 0.047 -0.006
(0.034) (0.049) (0.031) (0.045) (0.030) (0.045) (0.034) (0.044)
County Controls X X X X X X X X
County & Year FEs X X X X X X X X
Observations 721 525 721 525 721 522 721 525
Notes: The estimation sample is restircted to only rural areas (those counties outside of an MSA). The outcome is 
measured as offenses per 1,000 population and is observed by academic year. Even columns report results using 
the arrest data from the Colorado DPS , odd columns report results using the NIBRS data. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the county level in parentheses. All regressions are weighted by 
county population.
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Table 2.7: Poisson Base Specification for Adult Crime – Robustness Check
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Arrests NIBRS Arrests NIBRS Arrests NIBRS Arrests NIBRS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Percent on 4-Day Week 0.266 6.403 0.691 5.619 -0.854 -0.0745 0.551 -0.667
(0.466) (4.072) (0.300) (7.064) (0.714) (0.425) (0.010) (1.242)
Umemployment Rate -0.068 -0.79 -0.109 -0.533 -0.060 -0.11 -0.051 -0.188
(0.100) (0.832) (0.129) (1.250) (0.090) (0.093) (0.068) (0.215)
Percent on Free Lunch -2.356 44.65 -3.195 58.9 0.094 2.645 0.314 -2.614
(2.712) (39.930) (3.687) (52.510) (2.298) (2.542) (1.319) (8.666)
Percent White 4.218 80.63 3.108 103 2.961 5.124 -0.345 1.47
(2.850) (53.080) (3.642) (69.220) (2.767) (3.698) (1.889) (11.750)
Student/Teacher Ratio -7.032 -91.02 -12.861 -37.91 -9.711 22.19 -14.037 43.97
(13.184) (150.100) (16.556) (223.400) (12.061) (19.960) (8.472) (35.980)
County Controls X X X X X X X X
County & Year FEs X X X X X X X X
Observations 721 526 721 526 721 526 721 526
 Larceny  Property  Drug Violent
Notes: The estimation sample is restircted to only rural areas (those counties outside of an MSA). The outcome is 
measured as offenses per 1,000 population and is observed by academic year. Even columns report results using the 
arrest data from the Colorado DPS , odd columns report results using the NIBRS data. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Standard errors are clustered at the county level in parentheses. All regressions are weighted by county population.
Table 2.8: OLS Base Specification for Adult Crime – Robustness Check
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Percent on 4-Day Week 1.731*** 0.392 1.004** 0.576 -1.306* 0.072 0.037 0.394
(0.484) (0.628) (0.450) (0.539) (0.753) (0.565) (0.888) (0.666)
1-Year Lead in Adoption -- 0.399 -- 0.362 -- (0.109) -- 0.897**
(0.800) (0.662) (0.915) (0.455)
2-Year Lead in Adoption -- 0.293 -- 0.289 -- 0.267 -- 0.400
(0.348) (0.304) (0.480) (0.318)
County Controls X X X X X X X X
County & Year FEs X X X X X X X X
Observations 399 448 439 448 408 446 430 441
Notes: The estimation sample is restircted to only rural areas (those counties outside of an MSA). The outcome is measured as 
offenses per 1,000 population and is observed by academic year. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at 
the county level in parentheses. All regressions are weighted by county population.
Larceny  Property Drug Violent
Table 2.9: Poisson Model Leads of Treatments – Robustness Check (NIBRS Data)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Percent on 4-Day Week 2.813** 2.916** 3.836* 3.927* -0.020 -0.155 0.240 0.257
(1.346) (1.379) (1.996) (2.085) (0.647) (0.714) (0.773) (0.870)
1-Year Lead in Adoption -- 0.490 -- -0.541 -- -0.974 -- -0.225
(1.171) (2.529) (0.685) (1.157)
2-Year Lead in Adoption -- 0.518 -- 1.245 -- -0.409 -- 0.340
(0.592) (1.074) (0.251) (0.459)
County Controls X X X X X X X X
County & Year FEs X X X X X X X X
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450
Larceny  Property Drug Violent
Notes: The estimation sample is restircted to only rural areas (those counties outside of an MSA). The outcome is measured as 
offenses per 1,000 population and is observed by academic year. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are 
clustered at the county level in parentheses. All regressions are weighted by county population.
Table 2.10: OLS Leads of Treatments – Robustness Check (NIBRS Data)
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Arrests NIBRS Arrests NIBRS Arrests NIBRS Arrests NIBRS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Percent on 4-Day Week 1.652* 0.629* 1.349** 0.406 1.868 -0.00031 2.208** 0.463
-0.945 -0.351 -0.643 -0.288 -1.364 -0.727 -1.036 -0.834
County Controls X X X X X X X X
County & Year FEs X X X X X X X X
Observations 922 658 964 697 880 660 943 693
Larceny Property Drug Violent
Notes: The estimation sample is restircted to only rural areas (those counties outside of an MSA). The outcome 
is measured as offenses per 1,000 population and is observed by academic year. Even columns report results 
using the arrest data from the Colorado DPS , odd columns report results using the NIBRS data. * p<0.1, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the county level in parentheses. Panel A regressions are 
weighted by county population.
Table 2.11: Poisson Model Base Specification All Counties – Robustness Check
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Arrests NIBRS Arrests NIBRS Arrests NIBRS Arrests NIBRS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Percent on 4-Day Week 2.256*** 0.862 2.675*** 0.509 0.423 0.226 0.326 0.00654
(0.727) (0.672) (0.834) (1.374) (0.406) (0.392) (0.204) (0.567)
County Controls X X X X X X X X
County & Year FEs X X X X X X X X
Observations 964 707 964 707 964 707 964 707
Notes: The estimation sample is restircted to only rural areas (those counties outside of an MSA). The outcome is 
measured as offenses per 1,000 population and is observed by academic year. Even columns report results using the 
arrest data from the Colorado DPS , odd columns report results using the NIBRS data. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Standard errors are clustered at the county level in parentheses. Panel A regressions are weighted by county population.
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Table 2.12: OLS Base Specification All Counties – Robustness Check
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Chapter 3
The Academic Achievement of
American Indians
3.1 Introduction
Disparities in educational achievement for various groups in the United States have
been a concern of policy makers and economists for years. In a number of studies, sig-
nificant portions of observed racial wage differentials can be explained by controlling
for earlier academic achievement, raising concerns about long-term effects of relative
school performance. 1 While the black-white achievement gap has been extensively
studied, 2 the relative achievement of American Indians has received far less attention,
1For example, see OGorman (2010); O’Neill (1990); Johnson et al. (1998).
2For literature on the effect of socioeconomic conditions and family background on the black-white
achievement gap, see Jencks and Phillips (1998); Fryer and Levitt (2004); Armor (1992); Brooks-Gunn
et al. (1997); Mayer (1997).
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especially by economists. 3 Part of this is due to the small number of American Indian
students in most datasets. American Indians make up only about 1 percent of the stu-
dent population in the United States. However, American Indians are one of the most
disadvantaged groups in the United States, with the lowest employment rates and high-
est poverty rates of any racial or ethnic group (Census (2012)). Although it is widely
known that academic achievement is lower for American Indians than white students,
there is little work quantifying the impact of demographic and school characteristics
or comparing their performance to other disadvantaged groups. To our knowledge,
Clotfelter et al. (2009) is the only other economics study that reports on the American
Indian-white test score gap, based on data from North Carolina.
The first contribution of this paper is to document, in detail, the current test scores
of American Indian students relative to other groups, by describing mean gaps, the
overall distribution of test scores, and the changes as students age. In recent years,
the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) has conducted the National Indian
Education Survey (NIES) in connection with the National Assessment for Education
Progress (NAEP), allowing for more robust analysis of this group than in the past. We
use the restricted use data from this survey, together with data on school attributes and
locations to document how observed individual, school, and geographic characteristics
affect measures of the test score gap.
A second contribution of this paper is to explore how racial and cultural identifi-
cation influences measures of achievement gaps. Most achievement gap research has
taken a student’s race to be a fixed category. This study is unique in estimating the gap
3We use the designation “American Indian” rather than “Native American” as it is the term used by
NCES for racial and ethnic classification on the student and school records. “Native American” is also
confusing as it can mean any student born in the United States, as opposed to an immigrant.
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by using both the definition of the school and the definition of the student. The NAEP
surveys used contain two measures of racial and ethnic groups: those reported by the
school records and those reported by the student on the survey. As a result, gaps can be
estimated for students who are only identified in a racial or ethnic minority group by
themselves, only by their school, or by both.
This distinction is valuable because one proposed explanation for test score gaps
relates to the interplay between academic achievement and social group identification.
For example, the anthropologist John Ogbu developed the theory of oppositional iden-
tity among minority groups who found themselves involuntarily under the jurisdiction
of the United States as opposed to voluntary migrants. He argues that poor academic
performance is related to cultural opposition to the structural barriers and discrimina-
tion experienced by these groups: students that perceive school culture to be aligned
with “white” ideals are theorized to be more likely to exhibit negative attitudes toward
academic success.4
In a similar vein, Akerlof and Kranton (2002) theorize that if a student’s social cat-
egory prescriptions differ from the school’s ideals, then a student suffers identity loss
for diverging from her social category’s ideal school effort and as a result may underin-
vest in human capital. Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) present a two audience signaling
model that incorporates the ideas of peer dynamics with returns to schooling. The
model predicts that middle ability types will pool on low investment: some individuals
will underinvest in education when the cost of forgone social acceptance is greater than
the forgone high wage.
4See, for example, Fordham and Ogbu (1986).
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A number of researchers have empirically examined the relationship between iden-
tity and academic and economic outcomes. Fordham and Ogbu (1986) find evidence
in favor of the cultural opposition hypothesis, although Cook and Ludwig (1997) and
Ainsworth-Darnell and Downey (1998) do not. Benjamin and Strickland (2010) use
experimental data and find evidence that social identity affects fundamental economic
preferences, specifically time and risk preference. Others have documented the rela-
tionship between student popularity and grades across racial and ethnic groups and find
that some groups penalize individuals socially for Acting White. 5 Recent evidence also
suggests that identification with school may be the mechanism behind some academic
gains associated with policies like class size reductions (Fletcher (2009)).
The present study explicitly documents racial gaps in connection with a student’s
selection of race. American Indian students on average have more variation in this
choice, making this population well suited for addressing questions related to identity.
As described in detail below, the correspondence between a student’s own classification
and the school’s classification of a student is lower for American Indians than for other
groups. This lower correspondence is perhaps not surprising, as American Indian stu-
dents may have more latitude for choosing from multiple groups with which to identify.
American Indians have the highest rate of intermarriage of all race and ethnic groups in
the United States (Lofquist et al. (2012)): only one half of American Indians marry an-
other American Indian, compared to 95 percent of whites and 85 percent of blacks who
marry within their own race.6 Hispanic students may also have ancestry in indigenous
groups in Latin America, which also provides multiple options for classification. Fur-
5For examples, see Fordham (1996); Fryer (2002); Steele and Aronson (1998); Austen-Smith and
Fryer (2005); Fryer (2010); Fryer and Torelli. (2010).
6Previous literature documents the effect of intermarriage on the ethnic identification of children
(Duncan and Trejo (2007)).
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thermore, tribal policies allow an individual to be an enrolled tribal member based on
ancestry which ranges from 1/32 (among the Kaw Nation) documented heritage to 5/8
(among the Ute), which may promote awareness of American Indian ancestry among
individuals with many ancestral roots. This context provides more scope for examining
the role of self-identification.
Furthermore, tension between group identification and investments in formal school-
ing may be particularly salient for American Indians given their historical experience.
According to BIE (2012), in the early twentieth century it was “federal policy to accul-
turate and assimilate Indian people by eradicating their tribal cultures through a board-
ing school system.” This history is described in more detail in the next section, and
it suggests that cultural identity and formal education were perceived to be in conflict
over a long period.
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents mean differences in achievement
by school reported race for 4th and 8th graders in math and reading and documents the
impact of controlling for demographic and school characteristics. School reported race
is used in this section to make the results most comparable with previous studies of test
score gaps. Section 5 reports the quantile regression results, finding that the distribution
of scores for American Indian students is quite different than for other groups. Section
6 examines gaps related to reservation location and gaps based on self- and school-
reported race. Section 7 concludes.
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3.2 Historical Background
In 1819, the Indian Civilization Act initiated federal support for educating native
students. Initially, federal funds were provided mainly to missionary groups. Funding
was also connected to other Indian-specific policies: after the 1830 Indian Removal Act
forced the relocation of Cherokee and other tribes to what is now Oklahoma, federal
funds for missionary schools east of the Mississippi (where the Cherokee had previ-
ously lived) were eliminated and generous subsidies were provided for western schools.
In the 1870s, the government began to provide public schools through the Office of
Indian Affairs, although missionary schools continued to receive funding through gov-
ernment contracts.7
Most of the early federal schools were boarding schools. The first boarding school
for American Indian students, located in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, housed students from
throughout the United States. The dominant view was that boarding schools were nec-
essary to impede cultural transmission. The 1879 Annual Report of the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs stated “The progress of the pupils in industrial boarding schools is
far greater than day schools. The children being removed from the idle and corrupting
habits of savage homes are more easily led to adopt the customs of civilized life and
inspired with a desire to learn” (Quoted in Reyhner and Eder (2006), pg. 73). At this
point, federal funds were restricted to schools that only provided instruction in English
(a number of religious schools that provided some instruction in native languages in
early grades no longer received funding). There are many accounts of students being
punished for speaking native languages in any context, even in private conversations
7Much of this section draws on the histories provided in American Indian Education: A History
(Reyhner and Eder (2006)) and Education and the American Indian Szasz (1999).
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with each other; students were often given Anglo names, had to cut their hair, and were
forbidden to engage in religious or cultural practices. Tribal groups were also often
intermingled to impede native language use. (For example, the Carlisle School had 53
tribes represented in 1894.) The conflict between formal school and native languages
and cultures was particularly acute as attendance was frequently involuntary. In 1891,
Congress authorized compulsory education for Indians, with the Commissioner given
the right to reduce rations and annuities to families whose children were not enrolled.
Some of the most egregious examples of compulsion were the use of federal troops to
enforce attendance among the Hopi and Navajo. Dana Coolidge’s testimony in 1932
at the Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Indian Affairs summarizes many of
these conditions:
“I am making a brief statement of my experience with what I consider the
greatest shame of the Indian Service—the rounding up of Indian children
to be sent away to government boarding schools. . . . The children are
caught, often roped like cattle, and taken away from their parents, many
times never to return. They are transferred from school to school, given
white people’s names, forbidden to speak their own tongue, and when sent
to distant schools are not taken home for three years.” (Quoted in DeJong
1993, pg. 117-18)
Boarding schools came under criticism in the 1920s and 1930s, and the use of day
schools and traditional public schools subsequently increased. In 1934, the Johnson
O’Malley Act authorized federal contracts with states and territories to provide edu-
cation services. However, there were many reports that the new approach restricted
educational opportunities: geographic isolation limited access to day schools for many
students, and some public schools serving both American Indian and other students
provided fewer opportunities and resources to the American Indian students. Accord-
ingly, the House Select Committee to Investigate Indian Affairs and Conditions in 1944
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again advocated the use of boarding schools, particularly for rural communities like
those on the Navajo reservation. In 1969, the congressional report, Indian Education:
A National Tragedy, A National Challenge, commonly known as the Kennedy Report,
documented the continuing disparities in education. The Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act of 1975 (P.L. 93-638) began contract programs for tribes to
administer schools, and provided funds for supplemental programs for American Indian
children in public schools both on and off reservations.
The latest revision to this act was part of the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act
(NCLB), which reauthorized the program as Title VII Part A of the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act. Today, there are 183 Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) schools,
59 of which are federally run and the other 124 are tribally operated but funded through
BIE contracts or grants. The historical experience of conflict between native cultures
and formal schooling continues to be widely discussed in American Indian communi-
ties. Given this experience, the issues of personal identity and investment in formal
educational institutions are likely to be particularly salient for students with American
Indian ancestry.
3.3 Data and Methods
The main data source for this analysis is the National Assessment for Educational
Progress (NAEP), a math and reading exam administered by the National Center for
Education Statistics (NCES) to a random sample of 4th, 8th, and 12th grade students
throughout the United States. This is the largest nationally representative exam and
provides the best measure to compare students across areas in the United States. Sam-
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ples are designed to be representative of public school students and schools in each
state, with a probability sampling design that over-samples some student groups. Ap-
proximately 3,000 students are sampled from each participating state per subject and
per grade, with close to 150,000 students total for each subject and grade. On average,
there are 30 students in each sampled school.
Only about 1 percent of students in the U.S. are American Indians or Alaska Na-
tives. As a result, accurate estimates of their performance are limited in most studies.
To remedy this limitation, Executive Order 13336 authorized a new component of the
NAEP, the National Indian Education Study (NIES). This study provides a nationally
representative sample of American Indians in 4th and 8th grade for 2005, 2007, and
2009. The surveys include the universe of Bureau of Indian Education funded schools
in 2005, 2007 and 2009. These data also include state representative samples for states
with large populations of American Indian students with the number of states varying
over time.
The outcomes used in this analysis are math and reading scores in 4th and 8th grade
pooled over the years 2007 and 2009.8 We drop observations from Hawaii and Alaska
because populations and institutions for Native students in these states are significantly
different than those in the mainland United States.9 To be consistent with the achieve-
ment gap literature, we exclude Asians from our sample as well. Unfortunately, 12th
grade students are not included in this analysis because they are not included in the
NIES sample.
8We drop 2005 because it was the first year of the oversample. The American Indians in 2005 differ
on some observable characteristics from those in the 2007 and 2009 files. Results using the 2005 data
are largely similar to those reported in this paper.
9Test scores for American Indian students in Alaska are lower on average than in most other states,
particularly in reading. Native Hawaiian students are classified in the “Asian and Pacific Islander” cate-
gory, making it more difficult to analyze the relative performance of this population.
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One unique feature of the NAEP is that it contains two measures of student race.
The first is the race that is designated in the school records, school-reported race. The
second is the race category that the student selected on the NAEP exam, student re-
ported race. Prior to 2002, the NAEP used self-reported race as the primary race vari-
able; since 2002, school-reported race is the primary race variable used. The majority of
this paper’s initial analysis uses school-reported race since it is currently designated the
primary measure. This measure also makes the estimates comparable with other studies
that estimate racial and ethnic achievement gaps. Subsequent sections of this analysis
will investigate and discuss the relative importance of self- and school-identified race.
The NAEP uses a complex sampling design. First, to achieve a nationally repre-
sentative sample, students have different probabilities of being selected based on de-
mographic characteristics and their state. In order to get accurate statistical inferences,
each student is assigned a sampling weight based on their probability of selection; stu-
dents with a higher probability of selection are assigned lower weights. The original
sampling weights (ORIGWT) are used in all of the regression analysis in this study.
Second, the sample design differs from a simple random sample because sampling in-
volves the selection of clusters of students based on school and demographic variables.
The consequence is that observations are not independent of one another and traditional
standard errors will be under-estimated. The standard procedure to adjust for this is to
use the NAEP provided replicate weights (REPWGT) to produce jackknifed standard
errors.10
Finally, the NAEP uses itemized response theory to preserve efficiency. Each indi-
vidual student is assigned a subset of the assessment questions for a given subject area,
10See NAEP Data Companion for more details on these weights and the recommended jackknife
procedure.
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which means raw scores are not directly comparable across students. Instead, NAEP
assigns to each student five score estimates, or “plausible values,” ranging between 0
and 500 points. These plausible values are constructed by the NAEP using marginal
estimation scaling model techniques for latent variables (Mislevy and Sheehan 1987).
Essentially, these are random draws from a student’s posterior distribution conditional
on answers to the items assigned and demographic and background variables. The rec-
ommended procedure to deal with this survey feature is to use a multiple imputation
method. This method involves running a separate regressions for each of the plausi-
ble values. Following Rubin (1996), the final point estimates are an average of the
point estimates from these five regressions. The estimated variance of the final estimate
combines the standard errors of the five estimates (calculated using the jackknifing pro-
cedures described above) and the variance across the estimates:
V (βˆ ) =
m
∑
i=1
se2i +(1+
1
m)
m−1 m∑
i=1
(βˆm− ¯ˆβ ).11
Table 1 reports the mean characteristics of students by school-identified racial group.
The table indicates that demographic and family characteristics for American Indian
students are similar to those for black and Hispanic students, with more than three
quarters eligible for free and reduced price lunches, about a quarter living in homes
with less than 10 books, and with parental education levels that tend to be lower than
those for black students but higher than those for Hispanic students. Relatively more
American Indian students (about 1 out of every 8) are also classified as disabled com-
pared to the other groups.
11For more detail, see Section 3 of the NAEP Data Companion. Practically, this was implemented
using STATA’s multiple imputation package. This procedure for using NAEP data is standard when
individual student scores are used, but is not necessary in studies that draw on the NAEP reported state
averages or in studies that examine specific item responses.
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Table 1 also shows that the mismatch between school- and self-identified race is
greatest for American Indian students. Students who are identified to be white by
their school also report themselves to be white most of the time: 80 percent of school-
identified white fourth graders and 86 percent of school-identified white eighth graders
self report the same race. For black students, the mismatch is marginally higher, with
75 percent of school-identified black fourth graders and 80 percent of school-identified
black eighth graders also reporting themselves to be black. Hispanic students have
the lowest rate of mismatch: 90 percent of the school-designated Hispanic 4th graders
also self report as being Hispanic, and this match is 97 percent in 8th grade. However
for American Indian students, only 55 percent of school-identified American Indian
fourth graders and only 60 percent of school-identified American Indian eighth graders
choose the same designation. The reverse mismatch (percentage of all self-identified
students who are assigned the same category by the school) is similar; this finding is
reported in Appendix Table A.1. Nearly all self-designated white and black students
are assigned the same race by the school. About 60 percent of self-identified Hispanic
students are similarly identified by their schools. However, among student who desig-
nate themselves to be American Indian, only 44 percent of 4th graders and 65 percent
of 8th graders are also reported to be American Indian by the school. (Means of all
other characteristics by self-reported race are also reported in Appendix Table A.1.)
Why is the mismatch so large for American Indian students? Mismatches, in part,
stem from the fact that schools are much more likely to report students to be of the
majority group. Nearly all students who call themselves white are also called white by
their schools, but schools designate many students to be white who self report a differ-
ent race. Because the white population is large, this mismatch looks small as a percent-
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age of school-identified white students but large in comparison to the self-reported other
race group. For example, in 4th grade math, there are about 4,460 students who self
report as American Indian whose schools designate them as white. This is only 2 per-
cent of the school-designated white sample but comprises 40% of the self-identifying
American Indian sample. Because American Indian student populations are small in
many states, mismatches are highest for this group. Furthermore, the rate of mismatch
for self-identifying American Indian students is twice as high outside Western states
than within the West where American Indian populations are largest.
Schools are also more likely to report the same race/ethnicity as the student when
the student is limited English proficient. This is one reason why school-designated
Hispanic students nearly universally self identify as Hispanic. However, there are about
twice as many self-identifying Hispanic students as school-identified Hispanic students:
many of these students speak English fluently and these students are more likely to be
classified as white by their schools (or occasionally as American Indian). American
Indian students have lower rates of limited English proficiency than Hispanic students,
and therefore do not have as clear of a “marker” for the school. Hispanic populations
are much larger than American Indian populations, and students who self designate as
American Indian are more likely to be classified by their schools as Hispanic than the
reverse.
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3.4 Mean Differences in Achievement by School Reported
Racial Groups
The first part of this analysis documents the mean differences in achievement by
school reported race. Table 2 reports the mean math test score gap relative to whites
in standard deviation units for 4th and 8th graders; Table 3 contains the results for
reading. The first column of each set of results reports the raw gap with no controls. On
average, school-identified American Indians score 60 percent of a standard deviation
lower than school-identified whites on the NAEP math exam in 4th grade, increasing to
three quarters of a standard deviation by 8th grade. This gap is about 15 percent smaller
than the gap for school-identified black students. Gaps for black students are consistent
with other estimates in the literature. School-identified Hispanic students’ math gaps
are nearly the same as those for American Indians.
The raw gaps in reading for all three groups are more similar, between 60 and 70
percent of a standard deviation. In addition, the math gaps widen with age for all three
groups. However, the reading gaps in 8th grade are smaller or remain the same as in
4th grade for all three racial and ethnic groups.
The remaining columns of Tables 2 and 3 report regression adjusted mean differ-
ences in test scores by school reported race. Following the literature, covariates are
added first for personal and family characteristics. Family and individual level char-
acteristics include age, gender, disability status, English proficiency, eligibility for free
lunch and number of books in home. Eighth grade results also include parental edu-
cation measures (unavailable for fourth grade students). Adjusting for these factors re-
duces the gap considerably. About 40 percent of the raw math test score gap and about
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half of the raw reading gap for American Indians is explained by these factors. This
leaves a gap relative to whites of about a third of a standard deviation in both math and
reading. In unreported regressions examining subsets of these variables and in regres-
sions run separately for each racial sub-group, relatively more of the gap for Hispanics
is explained by English Language Learner status than for other groups. Socioeconomic
characteristics (free lunch status, number of books in the home, and parental education)
explain relatively more of the gap for American Indians than for black students or for
Hispanic students.
In the next column (column 3 for 4th grade and column 6 for 8th grade), school fixed
effects are included in addition to the individual and family characteristics. Including
these fixed effects means that the gaps are average comparisons of students of differ-
ent races and ethnicity within the same schools. The inclusion of school fixed effects
further reduces the math gap for American Indians by about 10 percent of a standard
deviation. School fixed effects have an even larger impact on the reading gap, reducing
this gap by 13 to 18 percent of a standard deviation. Similar results are obtained using
specific school characteristics such as level of urbanization, school size, and resource
measures in place of fixed effects.12 Surprisingly, these fixed effects have a negligible
impact on the black and Hispanic gaps. This may suggest that school characteristics
play a larger role for American Indians or that American Indians disproportionately se-
lect into different types of schools. We investigate the specific effect of school location
on a reservation in Section 6. Taken together, family, individual and school characteris-
tics explain roughly one half to two-thirds of the American Indian-white test score gap.
12Note that we are not claiming that schools matter less than socioeconomic factors in explaining
achievement gaps: the order covariates are introduced matters ?. We choose the order to be comparable
with other results in the achievement gap literature.
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These same factors account for two-thirds to three-fourths of the Hispanic-white gap
and only about a third of the black-white gap.
The last columns of Table 2 and 3 include the same covariates as the previous
columns as well as controls for parent education level. The NAEP data for 4th graders
do not include parental education. The education level of a student’s parent however,
matters very little in explaining the gap for American Indians and blacks after condi-
tioning on other covariates. The remainder of the analysis will exclude parental educa-
tion to make 4th and 8th grade results comparable.
3.5 Racial Gaps at Different points in the Achievement
Distribution
Examining test score behavior at the mean is useful. However, the conditional
mean only captures shifts in the distribution of the outcome. If the overall shapes of
the distribution of test scores are different by race/ethnicity, then assuming the adjusted
mean difference in test scores is constant across the conditional distribution will be
misleading. Quantile regression analysis allows for statistical inference at the median
as well as non-central locations. In this context, it allows for the estimation of gaps
across the test score distribution, relative to white students at the same point in the
distribution of white students. For example, if the distribution of scores for one group
had the same mean but was flatter than the distribution for another group, there would be
a positive gap at the 90th percentile and a negative gap at the 10th percentile. Likewise,
if one distribution had a thicker left tail, gaps at the 90th percentile might be small,
while those at the 10th percentile would be large. However, some care is needed in the
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interpretation of the coefficients when including covariates. A quantile coefficient is
the effect of the variable of interest on the distribution of the outcome variable, holding
all else constant. However, the coefficient does not measure the marginal effect on
individuals. This is a critical distinction: there is no guarantee that an individual will
remain in the pth quantile after a covariate is marginally altered.
Figure 3.1 shows that the unadjusted test score gap for all races relative to whites
for math and reading is largest at the 10th percentile and gets smaller monotonically
across the distribution. Each point on the graph represents a test score gap relative to
whites that corresponds to a given location in the distribution. For example, the upper
left graph in Figure 1 shows that American Indians in 4th grade at the 10 percentile have
a raw math gap of nearly 0.9 of a standard deviation relative to whites at that decile.
This falls to less than 0.6 for American Indian students in the highest decile.
Figure 1 also shows that the difference in the unadjusted test score gap between the
10th percentile and the 90th percentile is the largest for American Indians. The gradient
is steepest for American Indians in all grades and subjects, with a particularly sharp
difference in the gradients in 8th grade. The gradient for black students is relatively flat.
This implies that the overall shape of the distribution for black students is more similar
to that for white students, although the overall distribution is shifted. For American
Indian students, however, the distribution of raw scores has a much different shape.
This general pattern of larger gaps at lower deciles persists even after controlling
for other characteristics. Table 4 reports quantile regression results with bootstrapped
standard errors in parentheses, adjusting for individual, family, and school covariates.
American Indians in the 90th percentile have a gap of 12 percent of a standard deviation
in math in 4th grade and about a fourth of a standard deviation in 8th grade. However,
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at the 10th percentile these gaps are about twice as large. The reading results are even
more stark: virtually no gap exists at the 90th percentile, while the gap at the 10th
percentile is about 30 percent of a standard deviation in both 4th and 8th grade.
As in the raw scores, this pattern of much larger gaps at lower deciles is strikingly
different for American Indian students than for other racial and ethnic groups. School-
identified black and Hispanic students at the lowest end of the achievement distribution
also do worse relative to their white counterparts than those at the highest end, but the
difference is much smaller. For black students, the gap at the 10th percentile is only
about 6 percentage points larger than at the 90th percentile, and for Hispanic students
it is usually less than 5 percentage points larger.
One concern might be that the quantile results are driven by students attending
schools located on reservations. In unreported results, we have estimated these quantile
regressions for only students attending schools located outside of reservation bound-
aries. We find nearly identical estimates with similarly larger gaps at lower deciles
than at higher deciles. (These results are available on request.) We also estimated the
quantile regressions separately by race to examine the relative role of covariates on the
quantiles. We find that the magnitude of impact of socioeconomic variables (like the
number of books at home) has a relatively constant coefficient across the percentiles for
black and hispanic students. However, the magnitude of the effect on American Indian
students tends to be larger for the highest percentiles than for the lowest percentiles.
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3.6 Geography, Identity and the Achievement Gap
The previous two sections have established that American Indians score lower than
whites on the NAEP math and reading exams. In particular, the evidence suggests
that the math gap increases as students progress in school and that the gradient with
respect to the ability distribution is particularly steep for American Indians, with much
larger gaps for the poorest performing students. Disadvantages in family background
explain slightly less than half of the math gap and half of the reading gap. School
characteristics further reduce these gaps in math and reading by another 5-18 percent
of a standard deviation. This contribution of school effects is larger than for other racial
and ethnic groups in the sample. The following two subsections investigate the unique
geography and identity for American Indians as possible additional contributors.
3.6.1 Effect of Reservations on the American Indian Achievement
Gap
About a fourth of American Indians live on reservations, which in many cases are
remote areas with thin labor markets and few amenities. The NAEP oversamples these
areas, with about 40 percent of the American Indian sample coming from schools lo-
cated on reservations. The larger estimated impact of schools on test scores for Ameri-
can Indians relative to other groups may be in part related to reservation related factors,
but using school fixed effects in the earlier analysis obscures the specific role of reser-
vation location on American Indian students.
We identify schools located on reservations using GIS maps of reservation bound-
aries and each school’s longitude and latitude. Reservation boundaries in some areas
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are quite large and include schools that serve a substantial number of non-American
Indian students as well. Roughly 4,000 students in each sample attend schools on a
reservation, about 25 percent of which are identified by the school as non-American
Indian. Most of these students are reported to be white or Hispanic; very few are black.
13
We examine the effect of reservation location by estimating a separate effect of
reservations on American Indian and other students as in the following regression equa-
tion:
y = β0 +β1Onres+β2AI +β3Onres∗AI +αRace+σX + γZ +δState+ ε (3.1)
The variable Race includes controls for black, Hispanic and other. The vector X in-
cludes the standard set of individual and family characteristics as described in section
4. The vector Z is comprised of school characteristics such as level of urbanization and
school enrollment.14 State fixed effects are also included in this specification. Results
are reported in Table 5.
Table 5 indicates that the estimated effect of attending a school located on a reserva-
tion, β1, is negative, but is also small and indistinguishable from zero. This coefficient
captures the average effect of attending a school on a reservation for students of all
races and ethnicities. The coefficient on the variable AI, β2, measures the test score gap
for American Indians relative to white students in schools located outside reservation
boundaries. The estimates indicate that school-identified American Indians attending
13Similar results are obtained when we used distance to the center of a reservation and tribal or BIE
control of a school.
14We did not include expenditures as these were not available for BIE schools in 2009. However,
results for 2007 that also include expenditures are similar to those reported here.
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schools off of a reservation score on average about a quarter of a standard deviation
lower in math and reading in 4th grade than white students attending schools off of a
reservation. The gap in 8th grade math scores is slightly larger, while the gap in 8th
grade reading scores is slightly smaller.
Table 5 reports that the gaps are larger in schools located on reservations. The in-
teraction term, β3, measures the additional gap for American Indian students attending
a school on a reservation. The gap for an American Indian student on a reservation
relative to a white student on a reservation is the sum of coefficients β2 and β3, and
these gaps are uniformly larger than the off reservations gaps. Gaps on reservations are
about 16 to 20 percent of a standard deviation larger than off a reservation (with the
exception of reading in 8th grade); stated otherwise, on-reservation gaps are about 40
percent larger than off-reservation gaps. Due to data restrictions, these results can only
control for a limited set of school characteristics, and it may be that schools located on
reservations differ in systematic ways from schools in other locations. One key differ-
ence is that these schools have student bodies that are much more racially segregated.
The Bureau of Indian Education schools have student bodies that are nearly exclusively
American Indian. Of the roughly 250 other schools located on reservations, about 40
percent have student bodies that are 95 percent or more American Indian. Another 20
percent of schools on reservations have student bodies that are less than 20 percent
American Indian. As a result, estimated test gaps on reservations compare American
Indian and white students who on average attend different schools. The high correla-
tion between location and the makeup of the schools makes it difficult to disentangle
the effects of school characteristics, school location, and student race: given the small
size of many of these schools and the limited variation in student characteristics within
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them, using school fixed effects with this sub-sample leads to imprecisely estimated
coefficients.
3.6.2 Effect of Self Identification on the Racial Achievement Gap
As noted in the introduction, there are several reasons to believe that self-identity
may be particularly salient for American Indian students. Predictions from the “single
ideal” school model, put forth in Akerlof and Kranton (2002), suggest that students may
make lower investments in formal schooling if the behaviors and norms associated with
their social group do not align with those promoted by public schools. Given the long
history of explicit opposition to native languages and cultures by schools, this theory
may be particularly relevant to native populations. Furthermore, the high levels of
intermarriage provide more scope for individually deciding among groups with which
to identify.
As noted, the NAEP data include a student’s self-reported race/ethnicity in addition
to school reported race/ethnicity. This allows for investigation of how self-identification
and school-identification separately relate to test scores. As Table 1 and Appendix
Table A.1 indicated, the data reveal a significant discrepancy between school- and self-
reported race for American Indian students, far more than for any other group.
The choice of race and ethnicity, both by students and by schools, is likely en-
dogenous to student performance. Because of this self-selection, the coefficient esti-
mates should not be interpreted as causal effect of racial identification, but the rela-
tionships nonetheless are revealing of the association between academic outcomes and
self-identification or school-identification. Table 6 reports the test score gap for three
mutually exclusive identification categories: school-reported-only, self-reported-only,
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and both school- and self-reported. In 4th and 8th grade, the unexplained math gap for
students classified both by themselves and their schools as American Indian is substan-
tially larger than the gap for students who are only self- or only school-identified. A
similar pattern appears in the reading results. Furthermore, in 4th grade, both the math
and the reading gap for students that are school-only identified are larger than the gaps
for self-only identified American Indians. As students progress in school, however, this
reverses. By 8th grade, the gap for self-only identified American Indians is much larger
than the gap for school-only identified students. In fact, in 8th grade the reading test
score gap among those who self-identify as American Indian is more than 10 times as
large as the gap for students who are only school-identified as American Indian: school-
only-identified American Indians do not experience a reading gap relative to whites by
8th grade, while self-identified students have gaps of a quarter of a standard deviation.
The 8th grade math test score gap among self-only identified students is also larger than
the gap for school-only identified students, although the difference in math gaps is not
as dramatic as it is in the reading results.
A few of these patterns are similar for black students. The math and reading test
score gaps are also largest among those that are classified as both self- and school- iden-
tified. Similarly, in 4th grade school-only identified students have larger gaps than self-
only-identified students. Furthermore, the gaps for self-only-identified students grow
from 4th to 8th grade. However, unlike American Indians, by 8th grade the math gap
is still larger for school-only-identified blacks compared to self-only-identified blacks.
The reading gap by 8th grade is slightly larger for self-only-identified blacks compared
to school-only-identified blacks, but only by 8 percent of a standard deviation. This
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difference pales in comparison to the 25 percent of a standard deviation difference in
the gap between these two race classifications for American Indians.
In contrast, out of the three mutually exclusive race categories, in 4th grade His-
panics that are school-only-identified experience the largest gap in math and reading,
but by 8th grade, in both reading and math, the gap for self-only-identified Hispanics is
largest. Like with American Indians and black students, the gap for self-only-identified
students grows from 4th to 8th grade.
Appendix Table A.2, a companion table to Table 6, reports the effects for each
type of race category at the 10th and 90th percentiles. These results are similar to the
ones reported in Table 6. For all race classifications – self-only-identified, school-only-
identified, and both self- and school-identified – American Indians, blacks and Hispan-
ics at the 10th percentile experience a larger gap than those students at 90th percentile
in the achievement distribution. As before, gradients are steeper for American Indians
than other groups, although the gradient for self-only-identified American Indians is
the flattest of the three categories.
Theoretical and empirical evidence from the identity literature suggests that there
will be differences in individuals’ behavior depending on the salience of group mem-
bership. One hypothesis is that the concentration of a group in a school affects the
salience of group membership. Another possibility is that in locations where American
Indians are better known by the general population, there may be more defined stereo-
types or students may have a different propensities for how they classify themselves. In
these data, the mismatch between school- and self-identification is much larger in states
outside the West and in states with smaller percentages of American Indian students.
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Accordingly, we disaggregate students in three different ways: by reservation location,
by percent American Indian in the school, and by geographic location.
Table 7 reports regression results using the same specification used in Table 6. Panel
A is a sub-sample of only those who attend a school on a reservation. As noted, about
25 percent of students on reservations are identified by their schools as a classification
other than American Indian. Of these students, a little over a third self-identify as
American Indian. Panel B is the complement of the Panel A sub-sample. It includes all
the students that attend a school off a reservation; American Indians comprise roughly
3% of this sample.
Table 7 shows that, as before, students on a reservation have larger gaps on aver-
age than those off reservations in math, although the reading point estimates are more
similar across the two locations. Gaps are also generally largest for students jointly
identified as American Indian both by their schools and by themselves. Similarly, the
pattern of the relative impacts of school and self identification are parallel across the
two sub-samples, with generally declining gaps for school-only-identified students and
rising gaps for self-identified students moving from 4th to 8th grade. However, the co-
efficient for self-only-identified students is not statistically significant at conventional
levels on reservations. (This is due to the fact that the standard errors are much larger
in the small sample of reservation students).
The next two panels disaggregate instead on the basis of whether American Indian
students are a majority (Panel C) or a minority (Panel D) in the school. The average
gaps vary across these two sub-samples in a similar way as they do when comparing
reservation and off-reservation schools (Panel A and Panel B). Again, the gaps for
students who are school-only-identified decline from 4th to 8th grade, while those for
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self-only-identified students rise. Students who are both school- and self-identified have
the largest gaps, with point estimates that are similar across the sub-samples. Standard
errors are again larger in the sample of students in highly segregated schools, but the
point estimates are similar. Appendix Table A.3 replicates these results by Census
region, again with similar results.
The analysis presents compelling evidence that even in eighth grade school- and
self-racial identification of a student is remarkably inconsistent for American Indians,
more so than for any other racial or ethnic group in the sample. The gap for American
Indians who are self-only-identified is substantially larger than those that are school-
only-identified in 8th grade. It also appears that the gaps for self-only-identified stu-
dents become relatively larger as students progress in school while the gaps for school-
only-identified students declines, and this is true across schools of varying compositions
and locations.
3.7 Conclusion
American Indian academic achievement has been little studied, in spite of unique
socioeconomic, geographic, and historical factors than may influence student outcomes.
This study establishes a number of facts about the current state of American Indian
academic achievement in comparison with other racial and ethnic groups in the United
States. We investigate three general classes of explanations for racial and ethnic gaps.
First, American Indian students on average come from more disadvantaged family and
socioeconomic backgrounds than many other students. Second, schools for American
Indian students are more likely to be located in more geographically isolated communi-
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ties and on reservations. These and other school characteristics may affect performance.
Third, the unique history of formal education for American Indians makes it more prob-
able that conflicts related to group identification and academic achievement are salient
for this population.
We find a raw achievement gap of about 60 to 70 percent of a standard deviation
for both math and reading. These gaps are smaller than the gaps for blacks and similar
to the gap for Hispanics. As with other groups, the gaps also appear to be larger in
8th grade than in 4th grade for math. For reading, gaps are somewhat smaller in 8th
grade than in 4th grade for American Indian and Hispanic students, while remaining
relatively unchanged for black students.
Although the raw gaps are similar to those of other racial and ethnic groups, there
are a number of important differences. First, more of the gap can be explained with
observable characteristics for American Indian and Hispanic students than for black
students. School fixed effects explain more of the remaining gap for American Indians
than for both other groups. Demographic and school characteristics explain about two
thirds of the raw gap for American Indians: after controlling for individual, family, and
school characteristics, unexplained gaps for reading in 4th and 8th grade and for math
in 4th grade are about 20 percent of a standard deviation, while the unexplained gap
for 8th grade math is about 40 percent of a standard deviation. (For black students,
two-thirds of the raw gap remains unexplained after controlling for observed charac-
teristics.) Location on a reservation also matters: a gap exists off reservations, but the
achievement gap for American Indians students is somewhat larger on reservations than
in other areas.
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Second, we find that the distribution of test scores for American Indians is much
different than for other racial and ethnic groups. Black and Hispanic students have
score gaps that are comparatively uniform across the distribution: while students in the
top quintile obviously perform better than those in the lowest quintile, the gap relative to
white students in the same quintile is fairly similar across the distribution. In contrast,
for American Indians the gaps relative to whites are much larger for students at the
bottom of the achievement distribution. In reading, gaps at the 90th percentile are
negligible and insignificant after adjusting for student and school characteristics, while
at the 10th percentile, gaps are about a third of a standard deviation. In math, the gaps
at the 10th percentile are about twice as large as the gaps at the 90th percentile.
Finally, the different historical context of education for American Indians sug-
gests that there may be perceived conflicts between formal schooling and group iden-
tity. Although we cannot test for this directly, we exploit an unusual feature of the
NAEP data: it contains measures of both self- and school-identified race and ethnicity.
These data provide a unique opportunity to examine how self-identification and school-
identification may have different associations with achievement. The match between
self- and school-identification is lower for American Indians than for any other eth-
nic group. Gaps for students only identified as American Indian by the school decline
between 4th and 8th grade, while gaps for self-identified students increase as students
age. For example, there is no statistically significant gap in 8th grade reading for stu-
dents who are only identified by their school as American Indian, while self-identifying
American Indians (both with or without school identification) have a gap of one fourth
of a standard deviation. In contrast, for black and Hispanic students, the pattern across
these three mutually exclusive identification categories is less clear, with gaps that are
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more similar in magnitude. We do not find evidence that American Indian self-identity
is more salient by region of the country, by the concentration of American Indians in a
school, or in schools located on reservations. In all of these areas, the general pattern
is a declining gap from 4th to 8th grade for school-only-identified American Indians.
In contrast, the gaps for self-only-identified American Indians grow with age and are
universally larger than those gaps for school-only-identified students by 8th grade.
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Figure 1: Raw Racial and Ethnic Test Score Gaps Relative to White Students in Same
Percentile, weighted by sampling weights
1
Figure 3.1: Raw Racial and Ethnic Test Score Gaps Relative to White Students in Same
Percentile, weighted by sampling weights
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Test Scores
Math 0.000 0.247 -0.458 -0.490 -0.314 0.000 0.291 -0.577 -0.604 -0.409
(1.000) (0.704) (0.818) (0.742) (0.766) (1.000) (0.899) (1.016) (0.897) (0.928)
Race- School Identified
White 0.599 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.620 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.490) (0.485)
American Indian 0.027 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
(0.163) (0.162)
Black 0.182 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.186 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
(0.386) (0.389)
Hispanic 0.183 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.162 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
(0.387) (0.368)
Other 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.093) (0.076)
Race- Student Identified
White 0.495 0.796 0.109 0.013 0.061 0.539 0.859 0.082 0.007 0.013
(0.500) (0.403) (0.312) (0.115) (0.239) (0.499) (0.348) (0.274) (0.081) (0.115)
American Indian 0.034 0.023 0.553 0.018 0.010 0.025 0.011 0.606 0.008 0.003
(0.182) (0.150) (0.497) (0.131) (0.100) (0.156) (0.103) (0.489) (0.091) (0.053)
Black 0.146 0.007 0.037 0.743 0.020 0.156 0.009 0.020 0.799 0.008
(0.353) (0.084) (0.188) (0.437) (0.139) (0.363) (0.921) (0.140) (0.401) (0.091)
Hispanic 0.279 0.125 0.202 0.165 0.904 0.227 0.075 0.149 0.093 0.971
(0.448) (0.330) (0.402) (0.371) (0.294) (0.419) (0.263) (0.356) (0.291) (0.166)
Other 0.046 0.049 0.099 0.061 0.005 0.053 0.047 0.143 0.093 0.004
(0.209) (0.216) (0.298) (0.238) (0.071) (0.224) (0.212) (0.351) (0.291) (0.063)
Other Controls
Free/reduced lunch 0.492 0.299 0.786 0.775 0.797 0.443 0.263 0.748 0.728 0.751
(0.500) (0.458) (0.410) (0.418) (0.402) (0.497) (0.440) (0.434) (0.445) (0.433)
Books 0-10 0.124 0.062 0.223 0.208 0.229 0.145 0.089 0.230 0.188 0.296
(0.330) (0.242) (0.416) (0.406) (0.420) (0.352) (0.284) (0.421) (0.391) (0.457)
Books 11-25 0.215 0.152 0.289 0.300 0.327 0.214 0.158 0.292 0.296 0.318
(0.411) (0.359) (0.453) (0.458) (0.469) (0.410) (0.365) (0.454) (0.456) (0.466)
Books 26-100 0.336 0.378 0.283 0.272 0.268 0.349 0.372 0.320 0.340 0.274
(0.472) (0.485) (0.451) (0.445) (0.443) (0.477) (0.483) (0.466) (0.474) (0.446)
Books 100  plus 0.325 0.408 0.205 0.220 0.176 0.293 0.381 0.159 0.176 0.112
(0.468) (0.491) (0.403) (0.414) (0.381) (0.455) (0.486) (0.365) (0.380) (0.315)
Male 0.508 0.512 0.502 0.500 0.503 0.502 0.507 0.497 0.485 0.506
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Disabled 0.119 0.124 0.135 0.120 0.100 0.102 0.100 0.137 0.114 0.093
(0.324) (0.330) (0.341) (0.325) (0.300) (0.303) (0.300) (0.344) (0.318) (0.290)
English language learner 0.083 0.007 0.142 0.018 0.392 0.044 0.004 0.132 0.011 0.220
(0.277) (0.085) (0.349) (0.133) (0.488) (0.205) (0.064) (0.339) (0.103) (0.414)
Age 7.512 7.513 7.581 7.518 7.497 11.435 11.428 11.619 11.461 11.402
(1.161) (1.141) (1.158) (1.194) (1.190) (1.162) (1.148) (1.177) (1.201) (1.166)
Mother-H.S drop out - - - - - 0.104 0.068 0.137 0.085 0.259
(0.305) (0.251) (0.344) (0.279) (0.438)
Mother- H.S. grad - - - - - 0.208 0.208 0.230 0.233 0.179
(0.406) (0.406) (0.421) (0.423) (0.383)
Mother- some college - - - - - 0.173 0.182 0.174 0.192 0.119
(0.379) (0.386) (0.379) (0.394) (0.324)
Mother- college grad - - - - - 0.364 0.433 0.249 0.334 0.152
(0.481) (0.495) (0.432) (0.472) (0.359)
Mother- don't know - - - - - 0.151 0.110 0.210 0.156 0.291
(0.358) (0.313) (0.408) (0.363) (0.454)
Father- H.S. drop out - - - - - 0.108 0.083 0.128 0.082 0.231
(0.310) (0.276) (0.334) (0.275) (0.422)
Father- H.S. grad - - - - - 0.207 0.215 0.240 0.219 0.160
(0.405) (0.411) (0.427) (0.414) (0.366)
Father- some college - - - - - 0.136 0.150 0.136 0.131 0.091
(0.343) (0.357) (0.343) (0.337) (0.288)
Father- college grad - - - - - 0.306 0.382 0.169 0.231 0.126
(0.461) (0.486) (0.375) (0.421) (0.331)
Father- don't know - - - - - 0.242 0.170 0.327 0.337 0.392
(0.428) (0.376) (0.469) (0.473) (0.488)
Observations 322,992 193,506 8,871 58,727 59,066 278,096 172,324 7,492 51,583 45,064
Notes: Means of student characeristics are based on math sample.  Means for reading sample are nearly identical, and are available on request.
Standard Deviations in parentheses. Parental education not available for 4th grade.
Math
4th 8th
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics by Race: Means of Student Characteristics by School Reported Race
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4th 4th 4th 8th 8th 8th 8th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
American Indian- School Identified -0.598*** -0.340*** -0.203*** -0.740*** -0.418*** -0.366*** -0.344***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
Black- School Identified -0.735*** -0.482*** -0.427*** -0.879*** -0.580*** -0.554*** -0.564***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Hispanic- School Identified -0.599*** -0.182*** -0.157*** -0.724*** -0.237*** -0.237*** -0.188***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Other- School Identified -0.085*** -0.127*** -0.097*** -0.111*** -0.106***
(0.018) (0.018) -0.031 (0.030) (0.030)
Year 2009 -0.058*** -0.110*** -0.212*** -0.149** -0.138**
(0.010) (0.011) -0.015 (0.058) (0.054)
Age -0.033*** -0.049*** -0.134*** -0.137*** -0.125***
(0.004) (0.003) -0.007 (0.007) (0.007)
Male 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.155*** 0.156*** 0.147***
(0.004) (0.004) -0.006 (0.006) (0.006)
Disabled -0.544*** -0.561*** -0.890*** -0.882*** -0.851***
(0.007) (0.007) -0.012 (0.012) (0.012)
Limited English Proficiency -0.421*** -0.385*** -0.703*** -0.677*** -0.653***
(0.012) (0.010) -0.019 (0.019) (0.019)
Free Lunch -0.293*** -0.188*** -0.298*** -0.261*** -0.194***
(0.006) (0.005) -0.008 (0.008) (0.008)
Books 0-10 -0.396*** -0.335*** -0.655*** -0.626*** -0.525***
(0.008) (0.008) -0.010 (0.009) (0.009)
Books 11-25 -0.308*** -0.258*** -0.509*** -0.483*** -0.409***
-0.006 (0.006) -0.009 (0.008) (0.008)
Books 26-100 -0.062*** -0.043*** -0.263*** -0.247*** -0.207***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Mother- H.S. grad - - - - -0.0160
(0.011)
Mother- some college - - - - 0.135***
(0.010)
Mother- college grad - - - - 0.125***
(0.012)
Mother- don't know - - - - -0.085***
(0.011)
Father- H.S. grad - - - - 0.013
(0.009)
Father- some college - - - - 0.133***
(0.010)
Father- college grad - - - - 0.198***
(0.009)
Father- don't know - - - - 0.006
(0.008)
School Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 343,245 322,992 322,992 282,242 278,096 278,096 278,096
Math
The level of significance is indicated as follows: * p< 0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 3.2: Math Standardized Test Score Gaps in Standard Deviation Units
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4th 4th 4th 8th 8th 8th 8th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
American Indian- School Identified -0.642*** -0.364*** -0.186*** -0.575*** -0.280*** -0.155*** -0.138***
(0.024) (0.021) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.028) (0.028)
Black- School Identified -0.692*** -0.415*** -0.340*** -0.699*** -0.435*** -0.362*** -0.372***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Hispanic- School Identified -0.676*** -0.163*** -0.104*** -0.640*** -0.154*** -0.098*** -0.065***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Other- School Identified -0.035 -0.055** -0.108*** -0.117*** -0.113***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030)
Year 2009 -0.203*** -0.264*** -0.299*** -0.321*** -0.301***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Age -0.067*** -0.0751*** -0.129*** -0.125*** -0.116***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Male -0.146*** -0.138*** -0.206*** -0.198*** -0.199***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Disabled -0.807*** -0.762*** -0.860*** -0.790*** -0.758***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Limited English Proficiency -0.672*** -0.587*** -0.851*** -0.767*** -0.734***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
Free Lunch -0.387*** -0.263*** -0.283*** -0.195*** -0.154***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Books 0-10 -0.455*** -0.374*** -0.674*** -0.592*** -0.523***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Books 11-25 -0.331*** -0.273*** -0.476*** -0.417*** -0.372***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Books 26-100 -0.084*** -0.061*** -0.227*** -0.194*** -0.171***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Mother- H.S. grad - - - - -0.027**
(0.011)
Mother- some college - - - - 0.122***
(0.011)
Mother- college grad - - - - 0.065***
(0.010)
Mother- don't know - - - - -0.141***
(0.012)
Father- H.S. grad - - - - 0.037***
(0.009)
Father- some college - - - - 0.120***
(0.011)
Father- college grad - - - - 0.136***
(0.009)
Father- don't know - - - - 0.012
(0.010)
School Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 329,873 325,780 325,780 288,246 284,175 284,175 284,175
Reading
The level of significance is indicated as follows: * p< 0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 3.3: Reading Standardized Test Score Gaps in Standard Deviation Units
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4th 8th 4th 8th
(1) (2) (3) (4)
American Indian- School Identified
10th-Percentile -0.281*** -0.485*** -0.327*** -0.318***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.049) (0.049)
25th-Percentile -0.232*** -0.415*** -0.249*** -0.236***
(0.032) (0.040) (0.033) (0.031)
50th Percentile -0.194*** -0.348*** -0.164*** -0.158***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
75th Percentile -0.165*** -0.300*** -0.111*** -0.083**
(0.028) (0.027) (0.034) (0.035)
90th Percentile -0.121*** -0.267*** -0.068 0.016
(0.027) (0.032) (0.050) (0.047)
Black- School Identified
10th-Percentile -0.460*** -0.590*** -0.365*** -0.393***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016)
25th-Percentile -0.439*** -0.565*** -0.351*** -0.381***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012)
50th Percentile -0.427*** -0.550*** -0.337*** -0.359***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
75th Percentile -0.411*** -0.530*** -0.324*** -0.343***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
90th Percentile -0.390*** -0.511*** -0.313*** -0.331***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
Hispanic- School Identified
10th-Percentile -0.157*** -0.276*** -0.107*** -0.102***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017)
25th-Percentile -0.159*** -0.247*** -0.111*** -0.106***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
50th Percentile -0.156*** -0.233*** -0.107*** -0.102***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.015)
75th Percentile -0.157*** -0.209*** -0.101*** -0.096***
(0.010) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012)
90th Percentile -0.144*** -0.194*** -0.089*** -0.085***
(0.011) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019)
Observations 322,992 278,096 325,780 284,175
Math Reading
Notes: Racial subgroups also include a dummy variable for other. Additionally, the 
specification includes family/individual controls (see Table 2) and school fixed effects. 
The level of significance is indicated as follows: * p< 0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 3.4: Standardized Test Score Gaps by Quantile
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4th 8th 4th 8th
(1) (2) (3) (4)
On Reservation -0.057 -0.0103 -0.0585 -0.0207
(0.051) (0.044) (0.066) (0.039)
American Indian- School Identified -0.244*** -0.327*** -0.242*** -0.208***
(0.018) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027)
On Reservation*American Indian-School Identified -0.162** -0.208*** -0.214** -0.0542
(0.066) (0.064) (0.089) (0.061)
Observations 312,160 268,520 314,806 274,728
Math Reading 
Notes: Racial subgroups also include a dummy variable for other. Additionally, the specification 
includes family/individual controls (see Table 2) as well as state fixed effects and school controls 
(enrollment and level of urbanization). The level of significance is indicated as follows: * p< 0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 3.5: Standardized Test Score Gaps by Reservation Location
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4th 8th 4th 8th 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
American Indian
School Identified Only -0.169*** -0.193*** -0.147*** -0.022
(0.022) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Self Identified Only -0.154*** -0.288*** -0.113*** -0.251***
(0.017) (0.028) (0.021) (0.028)
School and Self Identified -0.238*** -0.495*** -0.216*** -0.251***
(0.025) (0.032) (0.029) (0.036)
Black
School Identified Only -0.402*** -0.388*** -0.345*** -0.258***
(0.010) (0.016) (0.013) (0.017)
Self Identified Only -0.249*** -0.365*** -0.262*** -0.344***
(0.020) (0.029) (0.024) (0.026)
School and Self Identified -0.440*** -0.603*** -0.342*** -0.400***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008)
Hispanic
School Identified Only -0.270*** -0.253*** -0.284*** -0.270***
(0.015) (0.046) (0.021) (0.051)
Self Identified Only -0.162*** -0.308*** -0.201*** -0.294***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010)
School and Self Identified -0.171*** -0.281*** -0.122*** -0.145***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
Observations 322,992 278,096 325,780 284,175
Math Reading
Notes: Racial subgroups also include a dummy variable for other. 
Additionally, the specification includes family/individual controls (See 
Table 2) and school fixed effects. The level of significance is indicated as 
follows: * p< 0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 3.6: Standardized Test Score Gaps by Group Identification
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4th 8th 4th 8th 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: School Located On Reservation
AI School Identified Only -0.400*** -0.372*** -0.215 -0.187
(0.101) (0.099) (0.185) (0.122)
AI Self Identified Only -0.208 -0.668* -0.308 -0.222
(0.204) (0.329) (0.303) (0.232)
AI School and Self Identified -0.480*** -0.659*** -0.201 -0.331*
(0.119) (0.070) (0.120) (0.092)
        Observations 4,555 3,632 4,782 3,850
        AI Observations* 3,855 3,075 4,233 3,390
Panel B:School Located Off Reservation
AI School Identified Only -0.158*** -0.180*** -0.135*** -0.015
(0.024) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
AI Self Identified Only -0.155*** -0.292*** -0.111*** -0.243***
(0.017) (0.028) (0.021) (0.028)
AI School and Self Identified -0.235*** -0.446*** -0.213*** -0.245***
(0.029) (0.035) (0.032) (0.040)
        Observations 311,538 268,394 313,985 274,307
        AI Observations* 11,568 7,185 11,523 7,371
Panel C: More than 50% AI in School
AI School Identified Only -0.272*** -0.0695 -0.244*** -0.134
(0.077) (0.083) (0.068) (0.093)
AI Self Identified Only -0.109 -0.196 -0.202 -0.333
(0.097) (0.280) (0.116) (0.173)
AI School and Self Identified -0.330*** -0.287*** -0.269*** -0.359
(0.061) (0.074) (0.081) (0.068)
        Observations 8,301 6,842 8,124 6,934
        AI Observations* 5,008 4,036 5,145 4,229
Panel D: Less than 50% AI in School
AI School Identified Only -0.198*** -0.179*** -0.138*** -0.017
(0.031) (0.034) (0.035) (0.038)
AI Self Identified Only -0.192*** -0.289*** -0.117*** -0.274***
(0.021) (0.028) (0.022) (0.031)
AI School and Self Identified -0.306*** -0.459*** -0.235*** -0.276***
(0.038) (0.040) (0.034) (0.046)
        Observations 314,691 271,254 317,656 277,241
        AI Observations* 10,693 6,457 10,892 6,792
*AI observations includes school identified American Indians, self identified American Indians and those that are 
school and self identified as American Indian.
Notes: Controls include all racial dummy variables, family/individual controls (see Table 2) and school fixed 
effects. The level of significance is indicated as follows: * p< 0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Math Reading
Table 3.7: Standardized Test Score Gaps by School Characteristics and Group Identifi-
cation
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Table A1: STEM Majors
Major Requires CHEM1A STEM Majors
X Biology
X Biochemistry
X Biopsychology
X Chemistry
X Engineering
X Computer Engineering
Computer Science
X Earth Science
X Ecology
X Environmental Science
Mathematics
Statistics
X Geophysics
X Hydrology
X Zoology
X Pharmacology
X Physics
X Physiology
X Physical Geography
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T
he
A
cadem
ic
A
chievem
entofA
m
erican
Indians
Full Sample White
American 
Indian Black Hispanic 
Full 
Sample White
American 
Indian Black Hispanic 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Test Scores
Math 0.000 0.264 -0.302 -0.464 -0.249 0.000 0.336 -0.576 -0.603 -0.375
(1.000) (0.708) (0.784) (0.721) (0.793) (1.000) (0.890) (0.986) (0.890) (0.948)
Race- School Identified
White 0.599 0.964 0.401 0.029 0.268 0.620 0.988 0.263 0.034 0.204
(0.490) (0.187) (0.490) (0.168) (0.443) (0.485) (0.107) (0.440) (0.181) (0.403)
American Indian 0.027 0.006 0.441 0.007 0.020 0.027 0.004 0.651 0.003 0.018
(0.163) (0.078) (0.497) (0.083) (0.140) (0.162) (0.064) (0.477) (0.059) (0.132)
Black 0.182 0.005 0.093 0.925 0.108 0.186 0.002 0.061 0.947 0.076
(0.386) (0.070) (0.290) (0.263) (0.310) (0.389) (0.048) (0.240) (0.223) (0.265)
Hispanic 0.183 0.022 0.054 0.025 0.594 0.162 0.004 0.018 0.009 0.694
(0.387) (0.148) (0.226) (0.155) (0.491) (0.369) (0.063) (0.134) (0.093) (0.461)
Other 0.009 0.003 0.012 0.014 0.010 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.008
(0.092) (0.054) (0.108) (0.117) (0.101) (0.076) (0.353) (0.079) (0.080) (0.091)
Race- Student Identified
White 0.495 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.539 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.500) (0.499)
American Indian 0.034 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
(0.182) (0.156)
Black 0.146 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.156 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
(0.353) (0.363)
Hispanic 0.279 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.227 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
(0.448) (0.419)
Other 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.209) (0.224)
Other Controls
Free/reduced lunch 0.492 0.291 0.667 0.768 0.686 0.443 0.249 0.713 0.726 0.670
(0.500) (0.454) (0.471) (0.422) (0.464) (0.497) (0.433) (0.452) (0.446) (0.470)
Books 0-10 0.124 0.064 0.175 0.213 0.185 0.145 0.081 0.217 0.196 0.258
(0.330) (0.245) (0.380) (0.409) (0.388) (0.352) (0.273) (0.412) (0.397) (0.437)
Books 11-25 0.215 0.155 0.259 0.308 0.276 0.214 0.156 0.286 0.302 0.287
(0.411) (0.362) (0.438) (0.462) (0.447) (0.410) (0.363) (0.452) (0.459) (0.452)
Books 26-100 0.336 0.379 0.305 0.271 0.293 0.349 0.376 0.318 0.335 0.292
(0.472) (0.485) (0.460) (0.444) (0.455) (0.477) (0.484) (0.466) (0.472) (0.455)
Books 100  plus 0.325 0.402 0.262 0.209 0.247 0.293 0.387 0.179 0.166 0.163
(0.468) (0.490) (0.440) (0.406) (0.431) (0.455) (0.487) (0.383) (0.372) (0.369)
Male 0.508 0.512 0.516 0.506 0.505 0.502 0.500 0.521 0.504 0.509
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) 0.500
Disabled 0.119 0.123 0.139 0.116 0.111 0.102 0.095 0.157 0.112 0.106
(0.324) (0.329) (0.346) (0.321) (0.315) (0.303) (0.294) (0.364) (0.315) (0.307)
English language learner 0.083 0.014 0.098 0.027 0.246 0.044 0.004 0.127 0.012 0.159
(0.277) (0.117) (0.297) (0.162) (0.431) (0.205) (0.063) (0.333) (0.111) (0.365)
Age 7.512 7.505 7.562 7.509 7.518 11.435 11.420 11.582 11.472 11.432
(1.161) (1.141) (1.159) (1.192) (1.184) (1.162) (1.148) (1.174) (1.201) (1.167)
Mother-H.S drop out - - - - - 0.104 0.061 0.134 0.085 0.217
(0.305) (0.239) (0.340) (0.279) (0.412)
Mother- H.S. grad - - - - - 0.208 0.207 0.233 0.237 0.189
(0.406) (0.405) (0.423) (0.425) (0.391)
Mother- some college - - - - - 0.173 0.182 0.171 0.189 0.136
(0.379) (0.386) (0.377) (0.391) (0.343)
Mother- college grad - - - - - 0.364 0.445 0.255 0.331 0.207
(0.481) (0.497) (0.436) (0.471) (0.405)
Mother- don't know - - - - - 0.151 0.105 0.207 0.158 0.251
(0.358) (0.307) (0.405) (0.365) (0.433)
Father- H.S. drop out - - - - - 0.108 0.077 0.132 0.084 0.198
(0.310) (0.267) (0.339) (0.277) (0.399)
Father- H.S. grad - - - - - 0.207 0.215 0.239 0.223 0.174
(0.405) (0.411) (0.427) (0.416) (0.379)
Father- some college - - - - - 0.136 0.151 0.133 0.127 0.104
(0.343) (0.358) (0.339) (0.333) (0.305)
Father- college grad - - - - - 0.306 0.394 0.182 0.230 0.171
(0.461) (0.489) (0.386) (0.421) (0.376)
Father- don't know - - - - - 0.242 0.162 0.314 0.337 0.354
(0.428) (0.368) (0.464) (0.473) (0.478)
Observations 322,939 159,877 11,131 47,152 89,969 278,074 149,765 6,969 43,478 63,084
Standard Deviations in parentheses. Parental education not available for 4th grade.
Math
4th 8th
Notes: Means of student characeristics are based on math sample.  Means for reading sample are nearly identical, and are available on request.
Table A1: Summary Statistics by Race: Means of Student Characteristics by Student Reported Race
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10th 90th 10th 90th 10th 90th 10th 90th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
American Indian
School Identified Only -0.231*** -0.0966** -0.282*** -0.105* -0.314*** -0.0053 -0.175** 0.122*
(0.057) (0.033) (0.046) (0.050) (0.063) (0.080) (0.059) (0.057)
Self Identified Only -0.189*** -0.127*** -0.317*** -0.267*** -0.124** -0.103*** -0.335*** -0.158***
(0.030) (0.020) (0.046) (0.040) (0.041) (0.028) (0.048) (0.040)
School and Self Identified-0.346*** -0.158*** -0.591*** -0.392*** -0.309*** -0.139** -0.401*** -0.106*
(0.057) (0.030) (0.055) (0.042) (0.053) (0.041) (0.067) (0.051)
Black
School Identified Only -0.448*** -0.353*** -0.411*** -0.369*** -0.382*** -0.307*** -0.285*** -0.231***
(0.023) (0.017) (0.027) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.027) (0.026)
Self Identified Only -0.284*** -0.234*** -0.400*** -0.364*** -0.307*** -0.227*** -0.417*** -0.262***
(0.040) (0.030) (0.056) (0.045) (0.051) (0.046) (0.049) (0.034)
School and Self Identified-0.466*** -0.410*** -0.645*** -0.556*** -0.358*** -0.323*** -0.433*** -0.365***
(0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.022) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Hispanic
School Identified Only -0.260*** -0.266*** -0.297*** -0.107 -0.287*** -0.288*** -0.427*** -0.203***
(0.034) (0.025) (0.078) (0.065) (0.039) (0.033) (0.102) (0.058)
Self Identified Only -0.172*** -0.141*** -0.365*** -0.243*** -0.223*** -0.180*** -0.388*** -0.227***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.012) (0.016) (0.020)
School and Self Identified-0.178*** -0.155*** -0.331*** -0.229*** -0.130*** -0.102*** -0.168*** -0.118***
(0.017) (0.012) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.020)
Observations 322,992 322,992 278,096 278,096 325,780 325,780 284,175 284,175
Notes: Racial subgroups also include a dummy variable for other. Additionally, the specification includes 
family/individual controls (see Table 2) and school fixed effects. The level of significance is indicated as follows: * p< 
0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Math Reading
4th 8th 4th 8th
Table A2: Standardized Test Score Gaps in Standard Deviation Units at 10-percentile
and 90-percentile
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4th  8th  4th  8th 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: American Indian-Northeast
School Identified Only ‐0.113 ‐0.119 ‐0.155 0.057
(0.082) (0.144) (0.088) (0.114)
Self Identified Only ‐0.103** ‐0.251*** ‐0.125** ‐0.192**
(0.038) (0.070) (0.052) (0.067)
School and Self Identified  ‐0.346 ‐0.730*** ‐0.152 ‐0.466
(0.245) (0.222) (0.250) (0.300)
        Observations 54,296 47,990 54,989 49,149
        AI Observations* 990 602 1,039 619
Panel C: American Indian-South
School Identified Only ‐0.099*** ‐0.232*** ‐0.124*** ‐0.039
(0.031) (0.041) (0.041) (0.051)
Self Identified Only ‐0.118*** ‐0.262*** ‐0.119*** ‐0.168***
(0.024) (0.048) (0.028) (0.052)
School and Self Identified  ‐0.117*** ‐0.417*** ‐0.087* ‐0.102*
(0.034) (0.046) (0.045) (0.048)
        Observations 119,018 100,655 118,667 102,774
        AI Observations*  4,539 2,628 4,604 2,769
Panel B: American Indian-Midwest
School Identified Only ‐0.147*** ‐0.121** ‐0.239*** 0.041
(0.049) (0.055) (0.058) (0.066)
Self Identified Only ‐0.120*** ‐0.283*** ‐0.118*** ‐0.297***
(0.026) (0.043) (0.036) (0.047)
School and Self Identified  ‐0.239*** ‐0.402*** ‐0.320*** ‐0.202***
(0.045) (0.072) (0.057) (0.066)
        Observations 74,336 66,699 75,954 67,974
        AI Observations*  3,872 2,775 3,973 2,887
Panel D: American Indian-West
School Identified Only ‐0.276*** ‐0.189** ‐0.125 ‐0.059
(0.043) (0.058) (0.071) (0.054)
Self Identified Only ‐0.272*** ‐0.340*** ‐0.097** ‐0.356***
(0.036) (0.070) (0.033) (0.071)
School and Self Identified  ‐0.344*** ‐0.580*** ‐0.283*** ‐0.380***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.051) (0.063)
        Observations 75,342 62,752 76,170 64,278
        AI Observations*  6,300 4,488 6,421 4,746
Math Reading
*AI observations includes school identified American Indians, self identified American Indians 
and those that are school and self identified as American Indian.
Notes: Controls include all racial dummy variables, family/individual controls (see Table 2) and 
school fixed effects. The level of significance is indicated as follows: * p< 0.10, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01.
Table A3: Standardized Test Score Gaps in Standard Deviation Units by Census Region
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